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Saturday, May 31, 2014
MYTHBUSTING HISTORICAL RESEARCH: NEW BOOK-
The Counter-Revolution of 1776: Slave Resistance and the Origins of the United States of America
Friday, May 30, 2014 - salon.com
White supremacy and slavery: Gerald Horne on the real story of American independence
It's time to revisit America's heroic creation myth and what really happened in 1776, author-historian tells Salon
With a sweeping and widely praised new essay on reparations
in the Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates has challenged Americans to
reconsider how they view their country’s history and to place the
influence of white supremacy front and center. Rather than imagine the
damages inflicted against African-Americans by white supremacy as having
occurred mainly during the antebellum period, Coates asks us to
recognize how Jim Crow in the South and redlining
in the North denied black people the means to build real, stable lives
for themselves, directly explaining the disproportionate poverty we
still see in the African-American community today. Yet
as penetrating as Coates’ essay may be, a new book from University of
Houston professor Gerald Horne would have our revision of our own
history stretch back even further — to the very founding itself. In “The Counter-Revolution of 1776: Slave Resistance and the Origins of the United States of America,”
Horne marshals considerable research to paint a picture of a U.S. that
wasn’t founded on liberty, with slavery as an uncomfortable and aberrant
remnant of a pre-Enlightenment past, but rather was founded on slavery — as a defense of
slavery — with the language of liberty and equality used as window
dressing. If he’s right, in other words, then the traditional narrative
of the creation of the U.S. is almost completely wrong. Salon
recently spoke with Horne about his book, why the conventional story of
the U.S. founding has been so widely accepted, and what this new view
of the American Revolution might mean for those still fighting white
supremacy today. Our conversation is below and has been lightly edited
for clarity and length. What’s the basic argument of your new book?
The
argument is that it is time to revisit the heroic creation myth of the
United States of America. My research has convinced me that we need to
look more closely at slavery and the slave trade in order to better
explicate the founding of a slave-owning republic in 1776. In other
words, in June 1772, in London, there was Somerset’s case,
which seemed to suggest the case’s initial meaning, which of course was
for England, could be extended across the Atlantic to the colonies.
This caused great consternation in the colonies, not the least since the
colonial economy was underpinned by slavery. It was not only the slave
trade itself which brought spectacular profits, sometimes as much as
1,600 percent … But it’s also that these profits are reported to allied
industries including banking, shipping, insurance, et cetera. And that,
in itself, was developing the productive forces of the colonies, which
then began to strain at the colonial leash, and the combination of these
factors led to a declaration of independence on July 4, 1776. What is the “creation myth” that you referred to just now, as you understand it? The
usual story runs — and you will hear it in profusion in about six to
eight weeks — is that these Olympian Founding Fathers—capital O, capital
F, capital F — in their utmost wisdom, revolted against tyranny from a
despotic monarch in London and established a glorious republic with
freedom and justice and liberty for all, as embodied in a wondrous
Constitution that emerged subsequently. Quite frankly, in a stunning
array of ideological diversity, scholars and ideologues from left to
right have basically bowed down before that creation myth. Was this a myth you believed in prior to writing this book? Why do you think it’s so powerful? Coming
to this book and writing this book was a process for myself. That is to
say, maybe 20-odd years ago, like many who have lived in the United
States of America, I had not given deep thought to the creation myth and
to that extent I think I can indict myself. With regard to the United
States of America, I think the fact that so many Europeans truly were
rescued from persecution by the creation of the United States of America
helped to blind some to the unavoidable fact that their rescue in some
ways was based on and founded upon a country that committed genocide
against indigenous people and then enslaved tens of thousands — hundreds
of thousands — of Africans. I
think that’s unfortunate because if you look, for example, at the
Dominican Republic, you may be aware of their dictatorial leader in the
1930s, Rafael Trujillo,
who opened his doors wide to Europeans (particularly those who were
Jewish who were fleeing persecution in the 1930s) and yet at the same
time he was massacring darker skin Haitians along the border in the
thousands. Now, Raphael Trujillo is not hailed and glorified because of
the former rescue; that rescue was put into context with his other
misdeeds; but somehow there has been a perverse form of affirmative
action afforded to the United States of America whereby there has
emerged a one-sided analysis that has led many to glorify the United
States because of the rescue of so many Europeans and the uplifting of
the standard of living of so many Europeans while at the same time
giving short shrift to the kinds of atrocities that were visited upon
the indigenous and the Africans. You
note in the book that there was a cultural gulf between Londoners and
colonists when it came to how they thought of people of African descent
and slavery. What was the disconnect — and why do you think it existed? To
be fair, there were only about 15,000 Africans in London in the 1770s.
They were not the essential component of the English economy nor the
Scottish economy. The exploitation of Africans basically took place
thousands of miles away. And thus it became easier, it seems to me, for
Londoners to have a more civilized attitude. It became easier for William Hogarth,
the painter, to invest Africans with a kind of humanity that was
marginally absent in terms of the consideration and contemplation of
many in the colonies. And I think this also helps to generate the schism
between the metropolis London and the mainland provinces that
ultimately leads to an eruption causing a unilateral declaration of
independence in July 1776. Increasingly, Londoners were coming to see
the colonists as being rather uncivilized with regard to their
maltreatment of Africans. This was particularly the case when the
colonists showed up in London itself and would engage in beating
enslaved Africans on the streets of London and this did not go down very
well amongst the Londoners. It did not go down very well amongst the
British subjects, generally. I do think that this is a factor amongst
many that creates this yawning gap — in some cases wider than the
Atlantic Ocean — between the colonies, on the one hand, and the colonial
master in London, on the other. Did
you find anything in your research that might explain why, exactly,
most historians up to now haven’t fully integrated slavery into their
analysis of the Revolution? I
think historians have really downplayed the amount of unrest amongst
slaves in the colonies — that is to say, in the 13 colonies that formed
the United States of America. Even today, if you look at the
historiography, there is an ongoing tendency to really downplay the
unrest amongst the Africans. There are historians who are earning good
livings by seeking to show, for example, that a number of slave revolts
really weren’t slave revolts. They were basically hallucinations on the
part of slave masters, guilty fears on the part of slave masters. There
has been a lot invested in suggesting that these ancestors of today’s
African-Americans were not very restive. I’ll leave it to future
scholars to try to puzzle out why that has been the case. Secondly,
I think that historians of colonial North America too often have looked
at colonial history as sort of pre-U.S. history. That is to say, when
they look at colonial history they only look at the 13 colonies; they
don’t look at Jamaica, Antigua, Barbados; they don’t look at what was
going on there even though these sites were all a part of one empire,
even though there was a lot of back-and-forth between those islands and
the North American mainland, even though all of them were administered
from London, even though a number of leading colonists on the mainland
were either born or spent time in the Caribbean (Alexander Hamilton
quickly comes to mind but there are many more), even though in the
Caribbean there were — even more so than on the mainland — repetitive
plots to liquidate the settlements, which at once caused many of the
Europeans to flee to the mainland and generated a sort of antipathy
towards Africans, the fruits of which I think are still with us. So, I
think that part of the problem with previous scholarship is a) as noted,
the downplaying of restiveness among Africans on the mainland, and b)
the sort of teleological approach where you don’t necessarily expand
your gaze to look beyond the 13 colonies. Was
this slavery-based motivation for independence widespread, or were
certain members of the founding generation more “counter-revolutionary,”
to use your language, than others? The
Virginians [were more counter-revolutionary] for sure. The Virginians
were the locomotive of the revolt. The Virginians being Patrick Henry,
Thomas Jefferson, George Washington — all of the familiar figures, many
of whom are on the currency in your wallet. I think that also reflects
the fact that before the U.S. Civil War, Virginians and slaveowners
dominated the White House and dominated the Congress. In other words,
they set up a republic to serve their interests, which is wholly
understandable. Of course, there are figures who were out of step with
these Virginians, most of whom have received short shrift — I’m thinking
of Thomas Payne in the first place, whose denunciation by figures like
Theodore Roosevelt should not be repeated on a family-friendly website … We’re not that, so by all means … [Laughs] Well, I’m still my mother’s son. But
in any case, I think that this is true even if you look at the figures
who … weren’t Virginians: John Hancock, for example, was a leading
slaveholder in Boston, Massachusetts. John Adams, who was the second
president, was a leading lawyer and propagandist for slaveowners. But,
to repeat, Virginians were the driving force behind this revolt. And
when you consider the Virginians, you have to also consider Lord Dunmore,
who is a well-known figure in terms of this period. He was the last
colonial governor of Virginia and in many ways exemplified the worst
nightmare for many of the settlers by seeking to arm the Africans to
help to squash an incipient revolt. But Lord Dunmore was not alone. What
helps to encourage North Carolina settlers to revolt was the fact that
their last colonial governor, Governor Martin, was also accused of
acting similarly, and the fact that Governor Martin had had previous
experience at Antigua, which was notorious for slave revolts, gave
sustenance to this idea that he would engage in the darkest of betrayals
by arming Africans to squash the revolt of British subjects. This
brings me to my other point, which is that in order for British
subjects to revolt against the crown, it takes something extraordinary.
This is not an everyday occurrence. But what I try to outline and
suggest is that what was pushing the settlers toward revolt was what I
call “The Black Scare.” That is to say, that this fear that armed
Africans would come down like a ton of bricks on their head. And this
was not necessarily a hallucination because, as pointed out in the book,
the Spanish had been arming Africans since the 1500s and from Spanish
Florida had been repeatedly raiding colonial South Carolina to great
effect … Indeed going back to the English Civil War in the mid-17th
century, you had the Africans involved in that conflict. And when
London, the British Empire, had begun to absorb defeat at the hands of
the Spanish — which was limiting the territorial expansion of the
British Empire — this was not only giving substance to the idea that
perhaps the better part of colonial wisdom was to arm Africans, but also
it was giving a jolt of adrenaline to the abolitionist movement, which
was growing by leaps and bounds in London at the same time. So
would it be right to say that, for people in the U.K. and in the
colonies, Africans and slaves played a much larger role in the
development of the revolution than what most of us are taught today? It
is correct. We oftentimes lose sight of the demographics [and] how in
numerous precincts on the North American mainland, Africans wildly
outnumbered Europeans … When you combine the Native American population
with that of the African population, you begin to get an idea of what I
mean when I say there’s this fear, if not hysteria, about arming
Africans to squash revolts of European settlers. This
ties to my other point, which is that, in order to understand the
particular scenario that I just outlined, it’s also useful to understand
… that in order to attract Europeans to what was ultimately a riotous
war zone — I’m speaking of colonial America, particularly the 13
colonies — there had to be emollients, there had to be inducements,
there had to be enticements. Now, of course, land taken from the Native
Americans, stocked with Africans, was one; but there are other
inducements as well. If
you’re right and if the U.S. was largely founded in defense of slavery
rather than in the name of liberty — if that kind of white supremacy is
so embedded in our very beginnings — how is it that descendants of
slaves were ever able to claim greater rights, first by ending slavery
and then dismantling Jim Crow? I
think that there’s a lesson here, and it is that, historically — before
the crumbling of Jim Crow in the 1950s — black Americans had sought out
allies, beginning with the Spanish in the late 17th century and then
the British from the late 18th century until the U.S. Civil War. And
then, in the succeeding decades, sought alliances with Mexico, with
India (as exemplified by the figure of Martin Luther King Jr. and his
creative adaptation of the Indian passive resistance movement) and the
African Liberation Movement and on to the present. So I think that
there, too, lie lessons as well, particularly for contemporary political
activists, who have an anti-racist agenda in mind. Seek allies … try to
lengthen the battlefield, so to speak, and not just be limited to those
who carry blue U.S. passports in terms of trying to forge social change
and political transformation in the United States.
Elias Isquith is an assistant editor at Salon, focusing on politics. Follow him on Twitter at @eliasisquith, and email him at eisquith@salon.com.
Saturday, May 24, 2014
The Case for Reparations
Two hundred fifty years of slavery. Ninety years
of Jim Crow. Sixty years of separate but equal. Thirty-five years of
racist housing policy. Until we reckon with our compounding moral debts,
America will never be whole.
And
if thy brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman, be sold unto thee, and
serve thee six years; then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go
free from thee. And when thou sendest him out free from thee, thou shalt
not let him go away empty: thou shalt furnish him liberally out of thy
flock, and out of thy floor, and out of thy winepress: of that wherewith
the LORD thy God hath blessed thee thou shalt give unto him.
And thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt,
and the LORD thy God redeemed thee: therefore I command thee this thing
today. — Deuteronomy 15: 12–15
Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying
from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate,
and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a
noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some
person or other, and some other man receives damage by his
transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has,
besides the right of punishment common to him with other men, a
particular right to seek reparation. — John Locke, “Second Treatise” By our unpaid labor and suffering, we have earned the right to
the soil, many times over and over, and now we are determined to have
it. — Anonymous, 1861
I. “So That’s Just One Of My Losses”
Clyde Ross was born in 1923, the
seventh of 13 children, near Clarksdale, Mississippi, the home of the
blues. Ross’s parents owned and farmed a 40-acre tract of land, flush
with cows, hogs, and mules. Ross’s mother would drive to Clarksdale to
do her shopping in a horse and buggy, in which she invested all the
pride one might place in a Cadillac. The family owned another horse,
with a red coat, which they gave to Clyde. The Ross family wanted for
little, save that which all black families in the Deep South then
desperately desired—the protection of the law.
In
the 1920s, Jim Crow Mississippi was, in all facets of society, a
kleptocracy. The majority of the people in the state were perpetually
robbed of the vote—a hijacking engineered through the trickery of the
poll tax and the muscle of the lynch mob. Between 1882 and 1968, more
black people were lynched in Mississippi than in any other state. “You
and I know what’s the best way to keep the nigger from voting,”
blustered Theodore Bilbo, a Mississippi senator and a proud Klansman.
“You do it the night before the election.”
The state’s regime partnered robbery of the franchise with robbery of
the purse. Many of Mississippi’s black farmers lived in debt peonage,
under the sway of cotton kings who were at once their landlords, their
employers, and their primary merchants. Tools and necessities were
advanced against the return on the crop, which was determined by the
employer. When farmers were deemed to be in debt—and they often were—the
negative balance was then carried over to the next season. A man or
woman who protested this arrangement did so at the risk of grave injury
or death. Refusing to work meant arrest under vagrancy laws and forced
labor under the state’s penal system.
Well into the 20th century, black people spoke of their flight from
Mississippi in much the same manner as their runagate ancestors had. In
her 2010 book, The Warmth of Other Suns, Isabel Wilkerson tells
the story of Eddie Earvin, a spinach picker who fled Mississippi in
1963, after being made to work at gunpoint. “You didn’t talk about it or
tell nobody,” Earvin said. “You had to sneak away.”
When
Clyde Ross was still a child, Mississippi authorities claimed his
father owed $3,000 in back taxes. The elder Ross could not read. He did
not have a lawyer. He did not know anyone at the local courthouse. He
could not expect the police to be impartial. Effectively, the Ross
family had no way to contest the claim and no protection under the law.
The authorities seized the land. They seized the buggy. They took the
cows, hogs, and mules. And so for the upkeep of separate but equal, the
entire Ross family was reduced to sharecropping.
This was hardly unusual. In 2001, the Associated Press published a
three-part investigation into the theft of black-owned land stretching
back to the antebellum period. The series documented some 406 victims
and 24,000 acres of land valued at tens of millions of dollars. The land
was taken through means ranging from legal chicanery to terrorism.
“Some of the land taken from black families has become a country club in
Virginia,” the AP reported, as well as “oil fields in Mississippi” and
“a baseball spring training facility in Florida.”
Clyde Ross was a smart child. His teacher thought he should attend a
more challenging school. There was very little support for educating
black people in Mississippi. But Julius Rosenwald, a part owner of
Sears, Roebuck, had begun an ambitious effort to build schools for black
children throughout the South. Ross’s teacher believed he should attend
the local Rosenwald school. It was too far for Ross to walk and get
back in time to work in the fields. Local white children had a school
bus. Clyde Ross did not, and thus lost the chance to better his
education.
Then, when Ross was 10 years old, a group of white men demanded his
only childhood possession—the horse with the red coat. “You can’t have
this horse. We want it,” one of the white men said. They gave Ross’s
father $17.
“I did everything for that horse,” Ross told me. “Everything. And
they took him. Put him on the racetrack. I never did know what happened
to him after that, but I know they didn’t bring him back. So that’s just
one of my losses.”
The
losses mounted. As sharecroppers, the Ross family saw their wages
treated as the landlord’s slush fund. Landowners were supposed to split
the profits from the cotton fields with sharecroppers. But bales would
often disappear during the count, or the split might be altered on a
whim. If cotton was selling for 50 cents a pound, the Ross family might
get 15 cents, or only five. One year Ross’s mother promised to buy him a
$7 suit for a summer program at their church. She ordered the suit by
mail. But that year Ross’s family was paid only five cents a pound for
cotton. The mailman arrived with the suit. The Rosses could not pay. The
suit was sent back. Clyde Ross did not go to the church program.
It
was in these early years that Ross began to understand himself as an
American—he did not live under the blind decree of justice, but under
the heel of a regime that elevated armed robbery to a governing
principle. He thought about fighting. “Just be quiet,” his father told
him. “Because they’ll come and kill us all.”
Clyde Ross grew. He was drafted into the Army. The draft officials
offered him an exemption if he stayed home and worked. He preferred to
take his chances with war. He was stationed in California. He found that
he could go into stores without being bothered. He could walk the
streets without being harassed. He could go into a restaurant and
receive service.
Ross was shipped off to Guam. He fought in World War II to save the
world from tyranny. But when he returned to Clarksdale, he found that
tyranny had followed him home. This was 1947, eight years before
Mississippi lynched Emmett Till and tossed his broken body into the
Tallahatchie River. The Great Migration, a mass exodus of 6 million
African Americans that spanned most of the 20th century, was now in its
second wave. The black pilgrims did not journey north simply seeking
better wages and work, or bright lights and big adventures. They were
fleeing the acquisitive warlords of the South. They were seeking the
protection of the law.
Clyde Ross was among them. He came to Chicago in 1947 and took a job
as a taster at Campbell’s Soup. He made a stable wage. He married. He
had children. His paycheck was his own. No Klansmen stripped him of the
vote. When he walked down the street, he did not have to move because a
white man was walking past. He did not have to take off his hat or avert
his gaze. His journey from peonage to full citizenship seemed
near-complete. Only one item was missing—a home, that final badge of
entry into the sacred order of the American middle class of the
Eisenhower years. In 1961, Ross and his wife bought a
house in North Lawndale, a bustling community on Chicago’s West Side.
North Lawndale had long been a predominantly Jewish neighborhood, but a
handful of middle-class African Americans had lived there starting in
the ’40s. The community was anchored by the sprawling Sears, Roebuck
headquarters. North Lawndale’s Jewish People’s Institute actively
encouraged blacks to move into the neighborhood, seeking to make it a
“pilot community for interracial living.” In the battle for integration
then being fought around the country, North Lawndale seemed to offer
promising terrain. But out in the tall grass, highwaymen, nefarious as
any Clarksdale kleptocrat, were lying in wait.
Three
months after Clyde Ross moved into his house, the boiler blew out. This
would normally be a homeowner’s responsibility, but in fact, Ross was
not really a homeowner. His payments were made to the seller, not the
bank. And Ross had not signed a normal mortgage. He’d bought “on
contract”: a predatory agreement that combined all the responsibilities
of homeownership with all the disadvantages of renting—while offering
the benefits of neither. Ross had bought his house for $27,500. The
seller, not the previous homeowner but a new kind of middleman, had
bought it for only $12,000 six months before selling it to Ross. In a
contract sale, the seller kept the deed until the contract was paid in
full—and, unlike with a normal mortgage, Ross would acquire no equity in
the meantime. If he missed a single payment, he would immediately
forfeit his $1,000 down payment, all his monthly payments, and the
property itself.
The men who peddled contracts in North Lawndale would sell homes at
inflated prices and then evict families who could not pay—taking their
down payment and their monthly installments as profit. Then they’d bring
in another black family, rinse, and repeat. “He loads them up with
payments they can’t meet,” an office secretary told The Chicago Daily News of
her boss, the speculator Lou Fushanis, in 1963. “Then he takes the
property away from them. He’s sold some of the buildings three or four
times.”
Ross had tried to get a legitimate mortgage in another neighborhood,
but was told by a loan officer that there was no financing available.
The truth was that there was no financing for people like Clyde Ross.
From the 1930s through the 1960s, black people across the country were
largely cut out of the legitimate home-mortgage market through means
both legal and extralegal. Chicago whites employed every measure, from
“restrictive covenants” to bombings, to keep their neighborhoods
segregated.
Their efforts were buttressed by the federal government. In 1934,
Congress created the Federal Housing Administration. The FHA insured
private mortgages, causing a drop in interest rates and a decline in the
size of the down payment required to buy a house. But an insured
mortgage was not a possibility for Clyde Ross. The FHA had adopted a
system of maps that rated neighborhoods according to their perceived
stability. On the maps, green areas, rated “A,” indicated “in demand”
neighborhoods that, as one appraiser put it, lacked “a single foreigner
or Negro.” These neighborhoods were considered excellent prospects for
insurance. Neighborhoods where black people lived were rated “D” and
were usually considered ineligible for FHA backing. They were colored in
red. Neither the percentage of black people living there nor their
social class mattered. Black people were viewed as a contagion.
Redlining went beyond FHA-backed loans and spread to the entire mortgage
industry, which was already rife with racism, excluding black people
from most legitimate means of obtaining a mortgage.
Explore Redlining in Chicago
“A government offering such bounty to builders and lenders could have
required compliance with a nondiscrimination policy,” Charles Abrams,
the urban-studies expert who helped create the New York City Housing
Authority, wrote in 1955. “Instead, the FHA adopted a racial policy that
could well have been culled from the Nuremberg laws.”
The devastating effects are cogently outlined by Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro in their 1995 book, Black Wealth/White Wealth:
Locked out of the greatest mass-based opportunity for wealth
accumulation in American history, African Americans who desired and
were able to afford home ownership found themselves consigned to
central-city communities where their investments were affected by the
“self-fulfilling prophecies” of the FHA appraisers: cut off from sources
of new investment[,] their homes and communities deteriorated and lost
value in comparison to those homes and communities that FHA appraisers
deemed desirable.
In Chicago and across the country, whites looking to achieve the
American dream could rely on a legitimate credit system backed by the
government. Blacks were herded into the sights of unscrupulous lenders
who took them for money and for sport. “It was like people who like to
go out and shoot lions in Africa. It was the same thrill,” a housing
attorney told the historian Beryl Satter in her 2009 book, Family Properties. “The thrill of the chase and the kill.”reporter’s notebook The
kill was profitable. At the time of his death, Lou Fushanis owned more
than 600 properties, many of them in North Lawndale, and his estate was
estimated to be worth $3 million. He’d made much of this money by
exploiting the frustrated hopes of black migrants like Clyde Ross.
During this period, according to one estimate, 85 percent of all black
home buyers who bought in Chicago bought on contract. “If anybody who is
well established in this business in Chicago doesn’t earn $100,000 a
year,” a contract seller told The Saturday Evening Post in 1962, “he is loafing.”
Contract sellers became rich. North Lawndale became a ghetto.
Clyde Ross still lives there. He still owns his home. He is 91, and
the emblems of survival are all around him—awards for service in his
community, pictures of his children in cap and gown. But when I asked
him about his home in North Lawndale, I heard only anarchy.
“We were ashamed. We did not want anyone to know that we were that
ignorant,” Ross told me. He was sitting at his dining-room table. His
glasses were as thick as his Clarksdale drawl. “I’d come out of
Mississippi where there was one mess, and come up here and got in
another mess. So how dumb am I? I didn’t want anyone to know how dumb I
was.
“When I found myself caught up in it, I said, ‘How? I just left this
mess. I just left no laws. And no regard. And then I come here and get
cheated wide open.’ I would probably want to do some harm to some
people, you know, if I had been violent like some of us. I thought,
‘Man, I got caught up in this stuff. I can’t even take care of my kids.’
I didn’t have enough for my kids. You could fall through the cracks
easy fighting these white people. And no law.”
But
fight Clyde Ross did. In 1968 he joined the newly formed Contract
Buyers League—a collection of black homeowners on Chicago’s South and
West Sides, all of whom had been locked into the same system of
predation. There was Howell Collins, whose contract called for him to
pay $25,500 for a house that a speculator had bought for $14,500. There
was Ruth Wells, who’d managed to pay out half her contract, expecting a
mortgage, only to suddenly see an insurance bill materialize out of thin
air—a requirement the seller had added without Wells’s knowledge.
Contract sellers used every tool at their disposal to pilfer from their
clients. They scared white residents into selling low. They lied about
properties’ compliance with building codes, then left the buyer
responsible when city inspectors arrived. They presented themselves as
real-estate brokers, when in fact they were the owners. They guided
their clients to lawyers who were in on the scheme.
The Contract Buyers League fought back. Members—who would eventually
number more than 500—went out to the posh suburbs where the speculators
lived and embarrassed them by knocking on their neighbors’ doors and
informing them of the details of the contract-lending trade. They
refused to pay their installments, instead holding monthly payments in
an escrow account. Then they brought a suit against the contract
sellers, accusing them of buying properties and reselling in such a
manner “to reap from members of the Negro race large and unjust
profits.” In
return for the “deprivations of their rights and privileges under the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,” the league demanded “prayers for
relief”—payback of all moneys paid on contracts and all moneys paid for
structural improvement of properties, at 6 percent interest minus a
“fair, non-discriminatory” rental price for time of occupation.
Moreover, the league asked the court to adjudge that the defendants had
“acted willfully and maliciously and that malice is the gist of this
action.”
Ross and the Contract Buyers League were no longer appealing to the
government simply for equality. They were no longer fleeing in hopes of a
better deal elsewhere. They were charging society with a crime against
their community. They wanted the crime publicly ruled as such. They
wanted the crime’s executors declared to be offensive to society. And
they wanted restitution for the great injury brought upon them by said
offenders. In 1968, Clyde Ross and the Contract Buyers League were no
longer simply seeking the protection of the law. They were seeking
reparations.
II. “A Difference of Kind, Not Degree”
According to the most-recent statistics,
North Lawndale is now on the wrong end of virtually every socioeconomic
indicator. In 1930 its population was 112,000. Today it is 36,000. The
halcyon talk of “interracial living” is dead. The neighborhood is 92
percent black. Its homicide rate is 45 per 100,000—triple the rate of
the city as a whole. The infant-mortality rate is 14 per 1,000—more than
twice the national average. Forty-three percent of the people in North
Lawndale live below the poverty line—double Chicago’s overall rate.
Forty-five percent of all households are on food stamps—nearly three
times the rate of the city at large. Sears, Roebuck left the
neighborhood in 1987, taking 1,800 jobs with it. Kids in North Lawndale
need not be confused about their prospects: Cook County’s Juvenile
Temporary Detention Center sits directly adjacent to the neighborhood.
North Lawndale is an extreme portrait of the trends that ail black
Chicago. Such is the magnitude of these ailments that it can be said
that blacks and whites do not inhabit the same city. The average per
capita income of Chicago’s white neighborhoods is almost three times
that of its black neighborhoods. When the Harvard sociologist Robert J.
Sampson examined incarceration rates in Chicago in his 2012 book, Great American City,
he found that a black neighborhood with one of the highest
incarceration rates (West Garfield Park) had a rate more than 40 times
as high as the white neighborhood with the highest rate (Clearing).
“This is a staggering differential, even for community-level
comparisons,” Sampson writes. “A difference of kind, not degree.”
In other words, Chicago’s impoverished black
neighborhoods—characterized by high unemployment and households headed
by single parents—are not simply poor; they are “ecologically distinct.”
This “is not simply the same thing as low economic status,” writes
Sampson. “In this pattern Chicago is not alone.”
The lives of black Americans are better than they were half a century ago. The humiliation of Whites Only
signs are gone. Rates of black poverty have decreased. Black
teen-pregnancy rates are at record lows—and the gap between black and
white teen-pregnancy rates has shrunk significantly. But such progress
rests on a shaky foundation, and fault lines are everywhere. The income
gap between black and white households is roughly the same today as it
was in 1970. Patrick Sharkey, a sociologist at New York University,
studied children born from 1955 through 1970 and found that 4 percent of
whites and 62 percent of blacks across America had been raised in poor
neighborhoods. A generation later, the same study showed, virtually
nothing had changed. And whereas whites born into affluent neighborhoods
tended to remain in affluent neighborhoods, blacks tended to fall out
of them.
This is not surprising. Black families, regardless of income, are
significantly less wealthy than white families. The Pew Research Center
estimates that white households are worth roughly 20 times as much as
black households, and that whereas only 15 percent of whites have zero
or negative wealth, more than a third of blacks do. Effectively, the
black family in America is working without a safety net. When financial
calamity strikes—a medical emergency, divorce, job loss—the fall is
precipitous.
And just as black families of all incomes remain handicapped by a
lack of wealth, so too do they remain handicapped by their restricted
choice of neighborhood. Black people with upper-middle-class incomes do
not generally live in upper-middle-class neighborhoods. Sharkey’s
research shows that black families making $100,000 typically live in the
kinds of neighborhoods inhabited by white families making $30,000.
“Blacks and whites inhabit such different neighborhoods,” Sharkey
writes, “that it is not possible to compare the economic outcomes of
black and white children.”
The implications are chilling. As a rule, poor black people
do not work their way out of the ghetto—and those who do often face the
horror of watching their children and grandchildren tumble back.
Even seeming evidence of progress withers under harsh light. In 2012,
the Manhattan Institute cheerily noted that segregation had declined
since the 1960s. And yet African Americans still remained—by far—the
most segregated ethnic group in the country.
With segregation, with the isolation of the injured and the robbed,
comes the concentration of disadvantage. An unsegregated America might
see poverty, and all its effects, spread across the country with no
particular bias toward skin color. Instead, the concentration of poverty
has been paired with a concentration of melanin. The resulting
conflagration has been devastating.
One thread of thinking in the African American community holds that
these depressing numbers partially stem from cultural pathologies that
can be altered through individual grit and exceptionally good behavior.
(In 2011, Philadelphia Mayor Michael Nutter, responding to violence
among young black males, put the blame on the family: “Too many men
making too many babies they don’t want to take care of, and then we end
up dealing with your children.” Nutter turned to those presumably
fatherless babies: “Pull your pants up and buy a belt, because no one
wants to see your underwear or the crack of your butt.”) The thread is
as old as black politics itself. It is also wrong. The kind of trenchant
racism to which black people have persistently been subjected can never
be defeated by making its victims more respectable. The essence of
American racism is disrespect. And in the wake of the grim numbers, we
see the grim inheritance.
The Contract Buyers League’s suit brought by Clyde Ross and his
allies took direct aim at this inheritance. The suit was rooted in
Chicago’s long history of segregation, which had created two housing
markets—one legitimate and backed by the government, the other lawless
and patrolled by predators. The suit dragged on until 1976, when the
league lost a jury trial. Securing the equal protection of the law
proved hard; securing reparations proved impossible. If there were any
doubts about the mood of the jury, the foreman removed them by saying,
when asked about the verdict, that he hoped it would help end “the mess
Earl Warren made with Brown v. Board of Education and all that nonsense.”
The
Supreme Court seems to share that sentiment. The past two decades have
witnessed a rollback of the progressive legislation of the 1960s.
Liberals have found themselves on the defensive. In 2008, when Barack
Obama was a candidate for president, he was asked whether his
daughters—Malia and Sasha—should benefit from affirmative action. He
answered in the negative.
The exchange rested upon an erroneous comparison of the average
American white family and the exceptional first family. In the contest
of upward mobility, Barack and Michelle Obama have won. But they’ve won
by being twice as good—and enduring twice as much. Malia and Sasha Obama
enjoy privileges beyond the average white child’s dreams. But that
comparison is incomplete. The more telling question is how they compare
with Jenna and Barbara Bush—the products of many generations of
privilege, not just one. Whatever the Obama children achieve, it will be
evidence of their family’s singular perseverance, not of broad
equality.
III. “We Inherit Our Ample Patrimony”
In 1783, the
freedwoman Belinda Royall petitioned the commonwealth of Massachusetts
for reparations. Belinda had been born in modern-day Ghana. She was
kidnapped as a child and sold into slavery. She endured the Middle
Passage and 50 years of enslavement at the hands of Isaac Royall and his
son. But the junior Royall, a British loyalist, fled the country during
the Revolution. Belinda, now free after half a century of labor,
beseeched the nascent Massachusetts legislature:
The face of your Petitioner, is now marked with the furrows
of time, and her frame bending under the oppression of years, while she,
by the Laws of the Land, is denied the employment of one morsel of that
immense wealth, apart whereof hath been accumilated by her own
industry, and the whole augmented by her servitude.
WHEREFORE, casting herself at your feet if your honours, as
to a body of men, formed for the extirpation of vassalage, for the
reward of Virtue, and the just return of honest industry—she prays, that
such allowance may be made her out of the Estate of Colonel Royall, as
will prevent her, and her more infirm daughter, from misery in the
greatest extreme, and scatter comfort over the short and downward path
of their lives.
Belinda Royall was granted a pension of 15 pounds and 12 shillings,
to be paid out of the estate of Isaac Royall—one of the earliest
successful attempts to petition for reparations. At the time, black
people in America had endured more than 150 years of enslavement, and
the idea that they might be owed something in return was, if not the
national consensus, at least not outrageous.
“A
heavy account lies against us as a civil society for oppressions
committed against people who did not injure us,” wrote the Quaker John
Woolman in 1769, “and that if the particular case of many individuals
were fairly stated, it would appear that there was considerable due to
them.”
As the historian Roy E. Finkenbine has documented, at the dawn of
this country, black reparations were actively considered and often
effected. Quakers in New York, New England, and Baltimore went so far as
to make “membership contingent upon compensating one’s former slaves.”
In 1782, the Quaker Robert Pleasants emancipated his 78 slaves, granted
them 350 acres, and later built a school on their property and provided
for their education. “The doing of this justice to the injured
Africans,” wrote Pleasants, “would be an acceptable offering to him who
‘Rules in the kingdom of men.’ ”
Planter: “You lazy nigger, I am losing a whole day’s labor by you.”
Freedman: “Massa, how many days’ labor have I lost by you?”
In the 20th century, the cause of reparations was taken up by a
diverse cast that included the Confederate veteran Walter R. Vaughan,
who believed that reparations would be a stimulus for the South; the
black activist Callie House; black-nationalist leaders like “Queen
Mother” Audley Moore; and the civil-rights activist James Forman. The
movement coalesced in 1987 under an umbrella organization called the
National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA).
The NAACP endorsed reparations in 1993. Charles J. Ogletree Jr., a
professor at Harvard Law School, has pursued reparations claims in
court.
But while the people advocating reparations have changed over time,
the response from the country has remained virtually the same. “They
have been taught to labor,” the Chicago Tribune editorialized in
1891. “They have been taught Christian civilization, and to speak the
noble English language instead of some African gibberish. The account is
square with the ex‑slaves.”
Not exactly. Having been enslaved for 250 years, black people were
not left to their own devices. They were terrorized. In the Deep South, a
second slavery ruled. In the North, legislatures, mayors, civic
associations, banks, and citizens all colluded to pin black people into
ghettos, where they were overcrowded, overcharged, and undereducated.
Businesses discriminated against them, awarding them the worst jobs and
the worst wages. Police brutalized them in the streets. And the notion
that black lives, black bodies, and black wealth were rightful targets
remained deeply rooted in the broader society. Now we have half-stepped
away from our long centuries of despoilment, promising, “Never again.”
But still we are haunted. It is as though we have run up a credit-card
bill and, having pledged to charge no more, remain befuddled that the
balance does not disappear. The effects of that balance, interest
accruing daily, are all around us.
Broach the topic of reparations today and a barrage of questions
inevitably follows: Who will be paid? How much will they be paid? Who
will pay? But if the practicalities, not the justice, of reparations are
the true sticking point, there has for some time been the beginnings of
a solution. For the past 25 years, Congressman John Conyers Jr., who
represents the Detroit area, has marked every session of Congress by
introducing a bill calling for a congressional study of slavery and its
lingering effects as well as recommendations for “appropriate remedies.” A country curious about how
reparations might actually work has an easy solution in Conyers’s bill,
now called HR 40, the Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for
African Americans Act. We would support this bill, submit the question
to study, and then assess the possible solutions. But we are not
interested.
“It’s because it’s black folks making the claim,” Nkechi Taifa, who helped found N’COBRA,
says. “People who talk about reparations are considered left lunatics.
But all we are talking about is studying [reparations]. As John Conyers
has said, we study everything. We study the water, the air. We can’t
even study the issue? This bill does not authorize one red cent to
anyone.”
That HR 40 has never—under either Democrats or Republicans—made it to
the House floor suggests our concerns are rooted not in the
impracticality of reparations but in something more existential. If we
conclude that the conditions in North Lawndale and black America are not
inexplicable but are instead precisely what you’d expect of a community
that for centuries has lived in America’s crosshairs, then what are we
to make of the world’s oldest democracy?
One cannot escape the question by hand-waving at the past, disavowing
the acts of one’s ancestors, nor by citing a recent date of ancestral
immigration. The last slaveholder has been dead for a very long time.
The last soldier to endure Valley Forge has been dead much longer. To
proudly claim the veteran and disown the slaveholder is patriotism à la
carte. A nation outlives its generations. We were not there when
Washington crossed the Delaware, but Emanuel Gottlieb Leutze’s rendering
has meaning to us. We were not there when Woodrow Wilson took us into
World War I, but we are still paying out the pensions. If Thomas
Jefferson’s genius matters, then so does his taking of Sally Hemings’s
body. If George Washington crossing the Delaware matters, so must his
ruthless pursuit of the runagate Oney Judge.
In 1909, President William Howard Taft told the country that
“intelligent” white southerners were ready to see blacks as “useful
members of the community.” A week later Joseph Gordon, a black man, was
lynched outside Greenwood, Mississippi. The high point of the lynching
era has passed. But the memories of those robbed of their lives still
live on in the lingering effects. Indeed, in America there is a strange
and powerful belief that if you stab a black person 10 times, the
bleeding stops and the healing begins the moment the assailant drops the
knife. We believe white dominance to be a fact of the inert past, a
delinquent debt that can be made to disappear if only we don’t look.
There has always been another way. “It is in vain to alledge, that our ancestors brought them hither, and not we,” Yale President Timothy Dwight said in 1810.
We inherit our ample patrimony with all its incumbrances; and are bound to pay the debts of our ancestors. This
debt, particularly, we are bound to discharge: and, when the righteous
Judge of the Universe comes to reckon with his servants, he will rigidly
exact the payment at our hands. To give them liberty, and stop here, is
to entail upon them a curse.
IV. “The Ills That Slavery Frees Us From”
America begins in black plunder and white democracy,
two features that are not contradictory but complementary. “The men who
came together to found the independent United States, dedicated to
freedom and equality, either held slaves or were willing to join hands
with those who did,” the historian Edmund S. Morgan wrote. “None of them
felt entirely comfortable about the fact, but neither did they feel
responsible for it. Most of them had inherited both their slaves and
their attachment to freedom from an earlier generation, and they knew
the two were not unconnected.”
When
enslaved Africans, plundered of their bodies, plundered of their
families, and plundered of their labor, were brought to the colony of
Virginia in 1619, they did not initially endure the naked racism that
would engulf their progeny. Some of them were freed. Some of them
intermarried. Still others escaped with the white indentured servants
who had suffered as they had. Some even rebelled together, allying under
Nathaniel Bacon to torch Jamestown in 1676.
One hundred years later, the idea of slaves and poor whites joining
forces would shock the senses, but in the early days of the English
colonies, the two groups had much in common. English visitors to
Virginia found that its masters “abuse their servantes with intollerable
oppression and hard usage.” White servants were flogged, tricked into
serving beyond their contracts, and traded in much the same manner as
slaves.
This “hard usage” originated in a simple fact of the New World—land
was boundless but cheap labor was limited. As life spans increased in
the colony, the Virginia planters found in the enslaved Africans an even
more efficient source of cheap labor. Whereas indentured servants were
still legal subjects of the English crown and thus entitled to certain
protections, African slaves entered the colonies as aliens. Exempted
from the protections of the crown, they became early America’s
indispensable working class—fit for maximum exploitation, capable of
only minimal resistance.
For the next 250 years, American law worked to reduce black people to
a class of untouchables and raise all white men to the level of
citizens. In 1650, Virginia mandated that “all persons except Negroes”
were to carry arms. In 1664, Maryland mandated that any Englishwoman who
married a slave must live as a slave of her husband’s master. In 1705,
the Virginia assembly passed a law allowing for the dismemberment of
unruly slaves—but forbidding masters from whipping “a Christian white
servant naked, without an order from a justice of the peace.” In that
same law, the colony mandated that “all horses, cattle, and hogs, now
belonging, or that hereafter shall belong to any slave” be seized and
sold off by the local church, the profits used to support “the poor of
the said parish.” At that time, there would have still been people alive
who could remember blacks and whites joining to burn down Jamestown
only 29 years before. But at the beginning of the 18th century, two
primary classes were enshrined in America.
“The two great divisions of society are not the rich and poor, but
white and black,” John C. Calhoun, South Carolina’s senior senator,
declared on the Senate floor in 1848. “And all the former, the poor as
well as the rich, belong to the upper class, and are respected and
treated as equals.”
In 1860, the majority of people living in South Carolina and
Mississippi, almost half of those living in Georgia, and about one-third
of all Southerners were on the wrong side of Calhoun’s line. The state
with the largest number of enslaved Americans was Virginia, where in
certain counties some 70 percent of all people labored in chains. Nearly
one-fourth of all white Southerners owned slaves, and upon their backs
the economic basis of America—and much of the Atlantic world—was
erected. In the seven cotton states, one-third of all white income was
derived from slavery. By 1840, cotton produced by slave labor
constituted 59 percent of the country’s exports. The web of this slave
society extended north to the looms of New England, and across the
Atlantic to Great Britain, where it powered a great economic
transformation and altered the trajectory of world history. “Whoever
says Industrial Revolution,” wrote the historian Eric J. Hobsbawm, “says
cotton.”
The
wealth accorded America by slavery was not just in what the slaves
pulled from the land but in the slaves themselves. “In 1860, slaves as
an asset were worth more than all of America’s manufacturing, all of the
railroads, all of the productive capacity of the United States put
together,” the Yale historian David W. Blight has noted. “Slaves were
the single largest, by far, financial asset of property in the entire
American economy.” The sale of these slaves—“in whose bodies that money
congealed,” writes Walter Johnson, a Harvard historian—generated even
more ancillary wealth. Loans were taken out for purchase, to be repaid
with interest. Insurance policies were drafted against the untimely
death of a slave and the loss of potential profits. Slave sales were
taxed and notarized. The vending of the black body and the sundering of
the black family became an economy unto themselves, estimated to have
brought in tens of millions of dollars to antebellum America. In 1860
there were more millionaires per capita in the Mississippi Valley than
anywhere else in the country.
Beneath the cold numbers lay lives divided. “I had a constant dread
that Mrs. Moore, her mistress, would be in want of money and sell my
dear wife,” a freedman wrote, reflecting on his time in slavery. “We
constantly dreaded a final separation. Our affection for each was very
strong, and this made us always apprehensive of a cruel parting.”
Forced partings were common in the antebellum South. A slave in some
parts of the region stood a 30 percent chance of being sold in his or
her lifetime. Twenty-five percent of interstate trades destroyed a first
marriage and half of them destroyed a nuclear family.
When the wife and children of Henry Brown, a slave in Richmond,
Virginia, were to be sold away, Brown searched for a white master who
might buy his wife and children to keep the family together. He failed:
The next day, I stationed myself by the side of the road,
along which the slaves, amounting to three hundred and fifty, were to
pass. The purchaser of my wife was a Methodist minister, who was about
starting for North Carolina. Pretty soon five waggon-loads of little
children passed, and looking at the foremost one, what should I see but a
little child, pointing its tiny hand towards me, exclaiming, “There’s
my father; I knew he would come and bid me good-bye.” It was my eldest
child! Soon the gang approached in which my wife was chained. I looked,
and beheld her familiar face; but O, reader, that glance of agony! may
God spare me ever again enduring the excruciating horror of that moment!
She passed, and came near to where I stood. I seized hold of her hand,
intending to bid her farewell; but words failed me; the gift of
utterance had fled, and I remained speechless. I followed her for some
distance, with her hand grasped in mine, as if to save her from her
fate, but I could not speak, and I was obliged to turn away in silence.
In a time when telecommunications were primitive and blacks lacked
freedom of movement, the parting of black families was a kind of murder.
Here we find the roots of American wealth and democracy—in the
for-profit destruction of the most important asset available to any
people, the family. The destruction was not incidental to America’s
rise; it facilitated that rise. By erecting a slave society, America
created the economic foundation for its great experiment in democracy.
The labor strife that seeded Bacon’s rebellion was suppressed. America’s
indispensable working class existed as property beyond the realm of
politics, leaving white Americans free to trumpet their love of freedom
and democratic values. Assessing antebellum democracy in Virginia, a
visitor from England observed that the state’s natives “can profess an
unbounded love of liberty and of democracy in consequence of the mass of
the people, who in other countries might become mobs, being there
nearly altogether composed of their own Negro slaves.”
V. The Quiet Plunder
The consequences of
250 years of enslavement, of war upon black families and black people,
were profound. Like homeownership today, slave ownership was
aspirational, attracting not just those who owned slaves but those who
wished to. Much as homeowners today might discuss the addition of a
patio or the painting of a living room, slaveholders traded tips on the
best methods for breeding workers, exacting labor, and doling out
punishment. Just as a homeowner today might subscribe to a magazine like
This Old House, slaveholders had journals such as De Bow’s Review,
which recommended the best practices for wringing profits from slaves.
By the dawn of the Civil War, the enslavement of black America was
thought to be so foundational to the country that those who sought to
end it were branded heretics worthy of death. Imagine what would happen
if a president today came out in favor of taking all American homes from
their owners: the reaction might well be violent.
“This country was formed for the white, not for the black man,” John Wilkes Booth wrote, before killing Abraham Lincoln. “And looking upon African slavery from the same standpoint held by those noble framers of our Constitution, I for one have ever considered it one of the greatest blessings (both for themselves and us) that God ever bestowed upon a favored nation.”
In the aftermath of the Civil War, Radical Republicans attempted to
reconstruct the country upon something resembling universal equality—but
they were beaten back by a campaign of “Redemption,” led by White
Liners, Red Shirts, and Klansmen bent on upholding a society “formed for
the white, not for the black man.” A wave of terrorism roiled the South. In his massive history Reconstruction,
Eric Foner recounts incidents of black people being attacked for not
removing their hats; for refusing to hand over a whiskey flask; for
disobeying church procedures; for “using insolent language”; for
disputing labor contracts; for refusing to be “tied like a slave.”
Sometimes the attacks were intended simply to “thin out the niggers a
little.”
Terrorism carried the day. Federal troops withdrew from the South in
1877. The dream of Reconstruction died. For the next century, political
violence was visited upon blacks wantonly, with special treatment meted
out toward black people of ambition. Black schools and churches were
burned to the ground. Black voters and the political candidates who
attempted to rally them were intimidated, and some were murdered. At the
end of World War I, black veterans returning to their homes were
assaulted for daring to wear the American uniform. The demobilization of
soldiers after the war, which put white and black veterans into
competition for scarce jobs, produced the Red Summer of 1919: a
succession of racist pogroms against dozens of cities ranging from
Longview, Texas, to Chicago to Washington, D.C. Organized white violence
against blacks continued into the 1920s—in 1921 a white mob leveled
Tulsa’s “Black Wall Street,” and in 1923 another one razed the black
town of Rosewood, Florida—and virtually no one was punished.
The
work of mobs was a rabid and violent rendition of prejudices that
extended even into the upper reaches of American government. The New
Deal is today remembered as a model for what progressive government
should do—cast a broad social safety net that protects the poor and the
afflicted while building the middle class. When progressives wish to
express their disappointment with Barack Obama, they point to the
accomplishments of Franklin Roosevelt. But these progressives rarely
note that Roosevelt’s New Deal, much like the democracy that produced
it, rested on the foundation of Jim Crow.
“The Jim Crow South,” writes Ira Katznelson, a history and
political-science professor at Columbia, “was the one collaborator
America’s democracy could not do without.” The marks of that
collaboration are all over the New Deal. The omnibus programs passed
under the Social Security Act in 1935 were crafted in such a way as to
protect the southern way of life. Old-age insurance (Social Security
proper) and unemployment insurance excluded farmworkers and
domestics—jobs heavily occupied by blacks. When President Roosevelt
signed Social Security into law in 1935, 65 percent of African Americans
nationally and between 70 and 80 percent in the South were ineligible.
The NAACP protested, calling the new American safety net “a sieve with
holes just big enough for the majority of Negroes to fall through.”
The oft-celebrated G.I. Bill similarly failed black Americans, by
mirroring the broader country’s insistence on a racist housing policy.
Though ostensibly color-blind, Title III of the bill, which aimed to
give veterans access to low-interest home loans, left black veterans to
tangle with white officials at their local Veterans Administration as
well as with the same banks that had, for years, refused to grant
mortgages to blacks. The historian Kathleen J. Frydl observes in her
2009 book, The GI Bill, that so many blacks were disqualified
from receiving Title III benefits “that it is more accurate simply to
say that blacks could not use this particular title.” In Cold War America, homeownership
was seen as a means of instilling patriotism, and as a civilizing and
anti-radical force. “No man who owns his own house and lot can be a
Communist,” claimed William Levitt, who pioneered the modern suburb with
the development of the various Levittowns, his famous planned
communities. “He has too much to do.”
But the Levittowns were, with Levitt’s willing acquiescence,
segregated throughout their early years. Daisy and Bill Myers, the first
black family to move into Levittown, Pennsylvania, were greeted with
protests and a burning cross. A neighbor who opposed the family said
that Bill Myers was “probably a nice guy, but every time I look at him I
see $2,000 drop off the value of my house.”
The neighbor had good reason to be afraid. Bill and Daisy Myers were
from the other side of John C. Calhoun’s dual society. If they moved
next door, housing policy almost guaranteed that their neighbors’
property values would decline.
Whereas
shortly before the New Deal, a typical mortgage required a large down
payment and full repayment within about 10 years, the creation of the
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation in 1933 and then the Federal Housing
Administration the following year allowed banks to offer loans requiring
no more than 10 percent down, amortized over 20 to 30 years. “Without
federal intervention in the housing market, massive suburbanization
would have been impossible,” writes Thomas J. Sugrue, a historian at the
University of Pennsylvania. “In 1930, only 30 percent of Americans
owned their own homes; by 1960, more than 60 percent were home owners.
Home ownership became an emblem of American citizenship.”
That emblem was not to be awarded to blacks. The American real-estate
industry believed segregation to be a moral principle. As late as 1950,
the National Association of Real Estate Boards’ code of ethics warned
that “a Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a
neighborhood … any race or nationality, or any individuals whose
presence will clearly be detrimental to property values.” A 1943
brochure specified that such potential undesirables might include
madams, bootleggers, gangsters—and “a colored man of means who was
giving his children a college education and thought they were entitled
to live among whites.”
The federal government concurred. It was the Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation, not a private trade association, that pioneered the
practice of redlining, selectively granting loans and insisting that any
property it insured be covered by a restrictive covenant—a clause in
the deed forbidding the sale of the property to anyone other than
whites. Millions of dollars flowed from tax coffers into segregated
white neighborhoods.
“For
perhaps the first time, the federal government embraced the
discriminatory attitudes of the marketplace,” the historian Kenneth T.
Jackson wrote in his 1985 book, Crabgrass Frontier, a history of
suburbanization. “Previously, prejudices were personalized and
individualized; FHA exhorted segregation and enshrined it as public
policy. Whole areas of cities were declared ineligible for loan
guarantees.” Redlining was not officially outlawed until 1968, by the
Fair Housing Act. By then the damage was done—and reports of redlining
by banks have continued.
The federal government is premised on equal fealty from all its
citizens, who in return are to receive equal treatment. But as late as
the mid-20th century, this bargain was not granted to black people, who
repeatedly paid a higher price for citizenship and received less in
return. Plunder had been the essential feature of slavery, of the
society described by Calhoun. But practically a full century after the
end of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, the plunder—quiet,
systemic, submerged—continued even amidst the aims and achievements of
New Deal liberals.
VI. Making The Second Ghetto
Today Chicago is one
of the most segregated cities in the country, a fact that reflects
assiduous planning. In the effort to uphold white supremacy at every
level down to the neighborhood, Chicago—a city founded by the black fur
trader Jean Baptiste Point du Sable—has long been a pioneer. The efforts
began in earnest in 1917, when the Chicago Real Estate Board, horrified
by the influx of southern blacks, lobbied to zone the entire city by
race. But after the Supreme Court ruled against explicit racial zoning
that year, the city was forced to pursue its agenda by more-discreet
means.
Like the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, the Federal Housing
Administration initially insisted on restrictive covenants, which helped
bar blacks and other ethnic undesirables from receiving federally
backed home loans. By the 1940s, Chicago led the nation in the use of
these restrictive covenants, and about half of all residential
neighborhoods in the city were effectively off-limits to blacks.
It is common today to become misty-eyed about the old black ghetto,
where doctors and lawyers lived next door to meatpackers and
steelworkers, who themselves lived next door to prostitutes and the
unemployed. This segregationist nostalgia ignores the actual conditions
endured by the people living there—vermin and arson, for instance—and
ignores the fact that the old ghetto was premised on denying black
people privileges enjoyed by white Americans.
In 1948, when the Supreme Court ruled that restrictive covenants,
while permissible, were not enforceable by judicial action, Chicago had
other weapons at the ready. The Illinois state legislature had already
given Chicago’s city council the right to approve—and thus to veto—any
public housing in the city’s wards. This came in handy in 1949, when a
new federal housing act sent millions of tax dollars into Chicago and
other cities around the country. Beginning in 1950, site selection for
public housing proceeded entirely on the grounds of segregation. By the
1960s, the city had created with its vast housing projects what the
historian Arnold R. Hirsch calls a “second ghetto,” one larger than the
old Black Belt but just as impermeable. More than 98 percent of all the
family public-housing units built in Chicago between 1950 and the
mid‑1960s were built in all-black neighborhoods.
Governmental embrace of segregation was driven by the virulent racism
of Chicago’s white citizens. White neighborhoods vulnerable to black
encroachment formed block associations for the sole purpose of enforcing
segregation. They lobbied fellow whites not to sell. They lobbied those
blacks who did manage to buy to sell back. In 1949, a group of
Englewood Catholics formed block associations intended to “keep up the
neighborhood.” Translation: keep black people out. And when civic
engagement was not enough, when government failed, when private banks
could no longer hold the line, Chicago turned to an old tool in the
American repertoire—racial violence. “The pattern of terrorism is easily
discernible,” concluded a Chicago civic group in the 1940s. “It is at
the seams of the black ghetto in all directions.” On July 1 and 2 of
1946, a mob of thousands assembled in Chicago’s Park Manor neighborhood,
hoping to eject a black doctor who’d recently moved in. The mob pelted
the house with rocks and set the garage on fire. The doctor moved away.
In 1947, after a few black veterans moved into the Fernwood section
of Chicago, three nights of rioting broke out; gangs of whites yanked
blacks off streetcars and beat them. Two years later, when a union
meeting attended by blacks in Englewood triggered rumors that a home was
being “sold to niggers,” blacks (and whites thought to be sympathetic
to them) were beaten in the streets. In 1951, thousands of whites in
Cicero, 20 minutes or so west of downtown Chicago, attacked an apartment
building that housed a single black family, throwing bricks and
firebombs through the windows and setting the apartment on fire. A Cook
County grand jury declined to charge the rioters—and instead indicted
the family’s NAACP attorney, the apartment’s white owner, and the
owner’s attorney and rental agent, charging them with conspiring to
lower property values. Two years after that, whites picketed and planted
explosives in South Deering, about 30 minutes from downtown Chicago, to
force blacks out.
When terrorism ultimately failed, white homeowners simply fled the neighborhood. The traditional terminology, white flight,
implies a kind of natural expression of preference. In fact, white
flight was a triumph of social engineering, orchestrated by the shared
racist presumptions of America’s public and private sectors. For should
any nonracist white families decide that integration might not be so bad
as a matter of principle or practicality, they still had to contend
with the hard facts of American housing policy: When the
mid-20th-century white homeowner claimed that the presence of a Bill and
Daisy Myers decreased his property value, he was not merely engaging in
racist dogma—he was accurately observing the impact of federal policy
on market prices. Redlining destroyed the possibility of investment
wherever black people lived.
VII. “A Lot Of People Fell By The Way”
Speculators in North Lawndale,
and at the edge of the black ghettos, knew there was money to be made
off white panic. They resorted to “block-busting”—spooking whites into
selling cheap before the neighborhood became black. They would hire a
black woman to walk up and down the street with a stroller. Or they’d
hire someone to call a number in the neighborhood looking for “Johnny
Mae.” Then they’d cajole whites into selling at low prices, informing
them that the more blacks who moved in, the more the value of their
homes would decline, so better to sell now. With these white-fled homes
in hand, speculators then turned to the masses of black people who had
streamed northward as part of the Great Migration, or who were desperate
to escape the ghettos: the speculators would take the houses they’d
just bought cheap through block-busting and sell them to blacks on
contract.
To keep up with his payments and keep his heat on, Clyde Ross took a
second job at the post office and then a third job delivering pizza. His
wife took a job working at Marshall Field. He had to take some of his
children out of private school. He was not able to be at home to
supervise his children or help them with their homework. Money and time
that Ross wanted to give his children went instead to enrich white
speculators.
“The problem was the money,” Ross told me. “Without the money, you
can’t move. You can’t educate your kids. You can’t give them the right
kind of food. Can’t make the house look good. They think this
neighborhood is where they supposed to be. It changes their outlook. My
kids were going to the best schools in this neighborhood, and I couldn’t
keep them in there.”
Mattie Lewis came to Chicago from her native Alabama in the mid-’40s,
when she was 21, persuaded by a friend who told her she could get a job
as a hairdresser. Instead she was hired by Western Electric, where she
worked for 41 years. I met Lewis in the home of her neighbor Ethel
Weatherspoon. Both had owned homes in North Lawndale for more than 50
years. Both had bought their houses on contract. Both had been active
with Clyde Ross in the Contract Buyers League’s effort to garner
restitution from contract sellers who’d operated in North Lawndale,
banks who’d backed the scheme, and even the Federal Housing
Administration. We were joined by Jack Macnamara, who’d been an
organizing force in the Contract Buyers League when it was founded, in
1968. Our gathering had the feel of a reunion, because the writer James
Alan McPherson had profiled the Contract Buyers League for The Atlantic back in 1972.
Weatherspoon
bought her home in 1957. “Most of the whites started moving out,” she
told me. “‘The blacks are coming. The blacks are coming.’ They actually
said that. They had signs up: Don’t sell to blacks.”
Before moving to North Lawndale, Lewis and her husband tried moving
to Cicero after seeing a house advertised for sale there. “Sorry, I just
sold it today,” the Realtor told Lewis’s husband. “I told him, ‘You
know they don’t want you in Cicero,’ ” Lewis recalls. “ ‘They ain’t
going to let nobody black in Cicero.’ ”
In 1958, the couple bought a home in North Lawndale on contract. They
were not blind to the unfairness. But Lewis, born in the teeth of Jim
Crow, considered American piracy—black people keep on making it, white
people keep on taking it—a fact of nature. “All I wanted was a house.
And that was the only way I could get it. They weren’t giving black
people loans at that time,” she said. “We thought, ‘This is the way it
is. We going to do it till we die, and they ain’t never going to accept
us. That’s just the way it is.’
“The only way you were going to buy a home was to do it the way they
wanted,” she continued. “And I was determined to get me a house. If
everybody else can have one, I want one too. I had worked for white
people in the South. And I saw how these white people were living in the
North and I thought, ‘One day I’m going to live just like them.’ I
wanted cabinets and all these things these other people have.”
Whenever she visited white co-workers at their homes, she saw
the difference. “I could see we were just getting ripped off,” she
said. “I would see things and I would say, ‘I’d like to do this at my
house.’ And they would say, ‘Do it,’ but I would think, ‘I can’t,
because it costs us so much more.’ ”
I asked Lewis and Weatherspoon how they kept up on payments.
“You paid it and kept working,” Lewis said of the contract. “When that payment came up, you knew you had to pay it.”
“You cut down on the light bill. Cut down on your food bill,” Weatherspoon interjected. “You cut
down on things for your child, that was the main thing,” said Lewis. “My
oldest wanted to be an artist and my other wanted to be a dancer and my
other wanted to take music.”
Lewis and Weatherspoon, like Ross, were able to keep their homes. The
suit did not win them any remuneration. But it forced contract sellers
to the table, where they allowed some members of the Contract Buyers
League to move into regular mortgages or simply take over their houses
outright. By then they’d been bilked for thousands. In talking with
Lewis and Weatherspoon, I was seeing only part of the picture—the tiny
minority who’d managed to hold on to their homes. But for all our
exceptional ones, for every Barack and Michelle Obama, for every Ethel
Weatherspoon or Clyde Ross, for every black survivor, there are so many
thousands gone. “A
lot of people fell by the way,” Lewis told me. “One woman asked me if I
would keep all her china. She said, ‘They ain’t going to set you
out.’ ”
VIII. “Negro Poverty is not White Poverty”
On a recent spring afternoon
in North Lawndale, I visited Billy Lamar Brooks Sr. Brooks has been an
activist since his youth in the Black Panther Party, when he aided the
Contract Buyers League. I met him in his office at the Better Boys
Foundation, a staple of North Lawndale whose mission is to direct local
kids off the streets and into jobs and college. Brooks’s work is
personal. On June 14, 1991, his 19-year-old son, Billy Jr., was shot and
killed. “These guys tried to stick him up,” Brooks told me. “I suspect
he could have been involved in some things … He’s always on my mind.
Every day.”
Brooks was not raised in the streets, though in such a neighborhood
it is impossible to avoid the influence. “I was in church three or four
times a week. That’s where the girls were,” he said, laughing. “The
stark reality is still there. There’s no shield from life. You got to go
to school. I lived here. I went to Marshall High School. Over here were
the Egyptian Cobras. Over there were the Vice Lords.”
Brooks has since moved away from Chicago’s West Side. But he is still
working in North Lawndale. If “you got a nice house, you live in a nice
neighborhood, then you are less prone to violence, because your space
is not deprived,” Brooks said. “You got a security point. You don’t need
no protection.” But if “you grow up in a place like this, housing
sucks. When they tore down the projects here, they left the high-rises
and came to the neighborhood with that gang mentality. You don’t have
nothing, so you going to take something, even if it’s not real. You
don’t have no street, but in your mind it’s yours.” We
walked over to a window behind his desk. A group of young black men
were hanging out in front of a giant mural memorializing two black men: In Lovin Memory Quentin aka “Q,” July 18, 1974 ❤ March 2, 2012.
The name and face of the other man had been spray-painted over by a
rival group. The men drank beer. Occasionally a car would cruise past,
slow to a crawl, then stop. One of the men would approach the car and
make an exchange, then the car would drive off. Brooks had known all of
these young men as boys.
“That’s their corner,” he said.
We watched another car roll through, pause briefly, then drive off.
“No respect, no shame,” Brooks said. “That’s what they do. From that
alley to that corner. They don’t go no farther than that. See the big
brother there? He almost died a couple of years ago. The one drinking
the beer back there … I know all of them. And the reason they feel safe
here is cause of this building, and because they too chickenshit to go
anywhere. But that’s their mentality. That’s their block.” Brooks showed me a picture of a
Little League team he had coached. He went down the row of kids,
pointing out which ones were in jail, which ones were dead, and which
ones were doing all right. And then he pointed out his son—“That’s my
boy, Billy,” Brooks said. Then he wondered aloud if keeping his son with
him while working in North Lawndale had hastened his death. “It’s a
definite connection, because he was part of what I did here. And I think
maybe I shouldn’t have exposed him. But then, I had to,” he said,
“because I wanted him with me.”
From the White House on down, the
myth holds that fatherhood is the great antidote to all that ails black
people. But Billy Brooks Jr. had a father. Trayvon Martin had a father.
Jordan Davis had a father. Adhering to middle-class norms has never
shielded black people from plunder. Adhering to middle-class norms is
what made Ethel Weatherspoon a lucrative target for rapacious
speculators. Contract sellers did not target the very poor. They
targeted black people who had worked hard enough to save a down payment
and dreamed of the emblem of American citizenship—homeownership. It was
not a tangle of pathology that put a target on Clyde Ross’s back. It was
not a culture of poverty that singled out Mattie Lewis for “the thrill
of the chase and the kill.” Some black people always will be twice as
good. But they generally find white predation to be thrice as fast.
Liberals
today mostly view racism not as an active, distinct evil but as a
relative of white poverty and inequality. They ignore the long tradition
of this country actively punishing black success—and the elevation of
that punishment, in the mid-20th century, to federal policy. President
Lyndon Johnson may have noted in his historic civil-rights speech at
Howard University in 1965 that “Negro poverty is not white poverty.” But
his advisers and their successors were, and still are, loath to craft
any policy that recognizes the difference.
After his speech, Johnson convened a group of civil-rights leaders,
including the esteemed A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin, to address
the “ancient brutality.” In a strategy paper, they agreed with the
president that “Negro poverty is a special, and particularly
destructive, form of American poverty.” But when it came to specifically
addressing the “particularly destructive,” Rustin’s group demurred,
preferring to advance programs that addressed “all the poor, black and
white.”
The
urge to use the moral force of the black struggle to address broader
inequalities originates in both compassion and pragmatism. But it makes
for ambiguous policy. Affirmative action’s precise aims, for instance,
have always proved elusive. Is it meant to make amends for the crimes
heaped upon black people? Not according to the Supreme Court. In its
1978 ruling in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
the Court rejected “societal discrimination” as “an amorphous concept of
injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.” Is affirmative
action meant to increase “diversity”? If so, it only tangentially
relates to the specific problems of black people—the problem of what
America has taken from them over several centuries. This confusion about affirmative
action’s aims, along with our inability to face up to the particular
history of white-imposed black disadvantage, dates back to the policy’s
origins. “There is no fixed and firm definition of affirmative action,”
an appointee in Johnson’s Department of Labor declared. “Affirmative
action is anything that you have to do to get results. But this does not
necessarily include preferential treatment.”
Yet America was built on the preferential treatment of white
people—395 years of it. Vaguely endorsing a cuddly, feel-good diversity
does very little to redress this.
Today, progressives are loath to invoke white supremacy as an
explanation for anything. On a practical level, the hesitation comes
from the dim view the Supreme Court has taken of the reforms of the
1960s. The Voting Rights Act has been gutted. The Fair Housing Act might
well be next. Affirmative action is on its last legs. In substituting a
broad class struggle for an anti-racist struggle, progressives hope to
assemble a coalition by changing the subject.
The politics of racial evasion are seductive. But the record is
mixed. Aid to Families With Dependent Children was originally written
largely to exclude blacks—yet by the 1990s it was perceived as a
giveaway to blacks. The Affordable Care Act makes no mention of race,
but this did not keep Rush Limbaugh from denouncing it as reparations.
Moreover, the act’s expansion of Medicaid was effectively made optional,
meaning that many poor blacks in the former Confederate states do not
benefit from it. The Affordable Care Act, like Social Security, will
eventually expand its reach to those left out; in the meantime, black
people will be injured.
“All that it would take to sink a new WPA
program would be some skillfully packaged footage of black men leaning
on shovels smoking cigarettes,” the sociologist Douglas S. Massey
writes. “Papering over the issue of race makes for bad social theory,
bad research, and bad public policy.” To ignore the fact that one of the
oldest republics in the world was erected on a foundation of white
supremacy, to pretend that the problems of a dual society are the same
as the problems of unregulated capitalism, is to cover the sin of
national plunder with the sin of national lying. The lie ignores the
fact that reducing American poverty and ending white supremacy are not
the same. The lie ignores the fact that closing the “achievement gap”
will do nothing to close the “injury gap,” in which black college
graduates still suffer higher unemployment rates than white college
graduates, and black job applicants without criminal records enjoy
roughly the same chance of getting hired as white applicants with criminal records.
Chicago, like the country at large, embraced policies that placed
black America’s most energetic, ambitious, and thrifty countrymen beyond
the pale of society and marked them as rightful targets for legal
theft. The effects reverberate beyond the families who were robbed to
the community that beholds the spectacle. Don’t just picture Clyde Ross
working three jobs so he could hold on to his home. Think of his North
Lawndale neighbors—their children, their nephews and nieces—and consider
how watching this affects them. Imagine yourself as a young black child
watching your elders play by all the rules only to have their
possessions tossed out in the street and to have their most sacred
possession—their home—taken from them.
The message the young black boy receives from his country, Billy
Brooks says, is “ ‘You ain’t shit. You not no good. The only thing you
are worth is working for us. You will never own anything. You not going
to get an education. We are sending your ass to the penitentiary.’
They’re telling you no matter how hard you struggle, no matter what you
put down, you ain’t shit. ‘We’re going to take what you got. You will
never own anything, nigger.’ ”
IX. Toward A New Country
When Clyde Ross was a child,
his older brother Winter had a seizure. He was picked up by the
authorities and delivered to Parchman Farm, a 20,000-acre state prison
in the Mississippi Delta region.
“He was a gentle person,” Clyde Ross says of his brother. “You know,
he was good to everybody. And he started having spells, and he couldn’t
control himself. And they had him picked up, because they thought he was
dangerous.”
Built at the turn of the century, Parchman was supposed to be a
progressive and reformist response to the problem of “Negro crime.” In
fact it was the gulag of Mississippi, an object of terror to African
Americans in the Delta. In the early years of the 20th century,
Mississippi Governor James K. Vardaman used to amuse himself by
releasing black convicts into the surrounding wilderness and hunting
them down with bloodhounds. “Throughout the American South,” writes
David M. Oshinsky in his book Worse Than Slavery, “Parchman Farm
is synonymous with punishment and brutality, as well it should be …
Parchman is the quintessential penal farm, the closest thing to slavery
that survived the Civil War.”
When the Ross family went to retrieve Winter, the authorities told
them that Winter had died. When the Ross family asked for his body, the
authorities at Parchman said they had buried him. The family never saw
Winter’s body.
And this was just one of their losses.
Scholars have long discussed methods by which America might make
reparations to those on whose labor and exclusion the country was built.
In the 1970s, the Yale Law professor Boris Bittker argued in The Case for Black Reparations
that a rough price tag for reparations could be determined by
multiplying the number of African Americans in the population by the
difference in white and black per capita income. That number—$34 billion
in 1973, when Bittker wrote his book—could be added to a reparations
program each year for a decade or two. Today Charles Ogletree, the
Harvard Law School professor, argues for something broader: a program of
job training and public works that takes racial justice as its mission
but includes the poor of all races.
To celebrate freedom and democracy while forgetting America’s origins in a slavery economy is patriotism à la carte.
Perhaps no statistic better
illustrates the enduring legacy of our country’s shameful history of
treating black people as sub-citizens, sub-Americans, and sub-humans
than the wealth gap. Reparations would seek to close this chasm. But as
surely as the creation of the wealth gap required the cooperation of
every aspect of the society, bridging it will require the same.
Perhaps
after a serious discussion and debate—the kind that HR 40 proposes—we
may find that the country can never fully repay African Americans. But
we stand to discover much about ourselves in such a discussion—and that
is perhaps what scares us. The idea of reparations is frightening not
simply because we might lack the ability to pay. The idea of reparations
threatens something much deeper—America’s heritage, history, and
standing in the world.
The early American economy
was built on slave labor. The Capitol and the White House were built by
slaves. President James K. Polk traded slaves from the Oval Office. The
laments about “black pathology,” the criticism of black family
structures by pundits and intellectuals, ring hollow in a country whose
existence was predicated on the torture of black fathers, on the rape of
black mothers, on the sale of black children. An honest assessment of
America’s relationship to the black family reveals the country to be not
its nurturer but its destroyer.
And this destruction did not end with slavery. Discriminatory laws
joined the equal burden of citizenship to unequal distribution of its
bounty. These laws reached their apex in the mid-20th century, when the
federal government—through housing policies—engineered the wealth gap,
which remains with us to this day. When we think of white supremacy, we
picture Colored Only signs, but we should picture pirate flags.
On some level, we have always grasped this.
“Negro poverty is not white poverty,” President Johnson said in his historic civil-rights speech.
Many of its causes and many of its cures are the same. But
there are differences—deep, corrosive, obstinate differences—radiating
painful roots into the community and into the family, and the nature of
the individual. These differences are not racial differences. They are
solely and simply the consequence of ancient brutality, past injustice,
and present prejudice.
We invoke the words of Jefferson and Lincoln because they say
something about our legacy and our traditions. We do this because we
recognize our links to the past—at least when they flatter us. But black
history does not flatter American democracy; it chastens it. The
popular mocking of reparations as a harebrained scheme authored by
wild-eyed lefties and intellectually unserious black nationalists is
fear masquerading as laughter. Black nationalists have always perceived
something unmentionable about America that integrationists dare not
acknowledge—that white supremacy is not merely the work of hotheaded
demagogues, or a matter of false consciousness, but a force so
fundamental to America that it is difficult to imagine the country
without it.
And so we must imagine a new country. Reparations—by which I mean the
full acceptance of our collective biography and its consequences—is the
price we must pay to see ourselves squarely. The recovering alcoholic
may well have to live with his illness for the rest of his life. But at
least he is not living a drunken lie. Reparations beckons us to reject
the intoxication of hubris and see America as it is—the work of fallible
humans.
Won’t reparations divide us? Not any more than we are already
divided. The wealth gap merely puts a number on something we feel but
cannot say—that American prosperity was ill-gotten and selective in its
distribution. What is needed is an airing of family secrets, a settling
with old ghosts. What is needed is a healing of the American psyche and
the banishment of white guilt.
What I’m talking about is more than recompense for past
injustices—more than a handout, a payoff, hush money, or a reluctant
bribe. What I’m talking about is a national reckoning that would lead to
spiritual renewal. Reparations would mean the end of scarfing hot dogs
on the Fourth of July while denying the facts of our heritage.
Reparations would mean the end of yelling “patriotism” while waving a
Confederate flag. Reparations would mean a revolution of the American
consciousness, a reconciling of our self-image as the great democratizer
with the facts of our history.
X. “There Will Be No ‘Reparations’ From Germany”
We are not the first to be summoned to such a challenge.
In 1952, when West Germany began the process of making amends for the
Holocaust, it did so under conditions that should be instructive to us.
Resistance was violent. Very few Germans believed that Jews were
entitled to anything. Only 5 percent of West Germans surveyed reported
feeling guilty about the Holocaust, and only 29 percent believed that
Jews were owed restitution from the German people.
“The rest,” the historian Tony Judt wrote in his 2005 book, Postwar,
“were divided between those (some two-fifths of respondents) who
thought that only people ‘who really committed something’ were
responsible and should pay, and those (21 percent) who thought ‘that the
Jews themselves were partly responsible for what happened to them
during the Third Reich.’ ”
Germany’s unwillingness to squarely face its history went beyond
polls. Movies that suggested a societal responsibility for the Holocaust
beyond Hitler were banned. “The German soldier fought bravely and
honorably for his homeland,” claimed President Eisenhower, endorsing the
Teutonic national myth. Judt wrote, “Throughout the fifties West German
officialdom encouraged a comfortable view of the German past in which
the Wehrmacht was heroic, while Nazis were in a minority and properly
punished.”
Konrad Adenauer, the postwar German chancellor, was in favor of
reparations, but his own party was divided, and he was able to get an
agreement passed only with the votes of the Social Democratic
opposition.
Among the Jews of Israel, reparations
provoked violent and venomous reactions ranging from denunciation to
assassination plots. On January 7, 1952, as the Knesset—the Israeli
parliament—convened to discuss the prospect of a reparations agreement
with West Germany, Menachem Begin, the future prime minister of Israel,
stood in front of a large crowd, inveighing against the country that had
plundered the lives, labor, and property of his people. Begin claimed
that all Germans were Nazis and guilty of murder. His condemnations then
spread to his own young state. He urged the crowd to stop paying taxes
and claimed that the nascent Israeli nation characterized the fight over
whether or not to accept reparations as a “war to the death.” When
alerted that the police watching the gathering were carrying tear gas,
allegedly of German manufacture, Begin yelled, “The same gases that
asphyxiated our parents!”
Begin then led the crowd in an oath to never forget the victims of
the Shoah, lest “my right hand lose its cunning” and “my tongue cleave
to the roof of my mouth.” He took the crowd through the streets toward
the Knesset. From the rooftops, police repelled the crowd with tear gas
and smoke bombs. But the wind shifted, and the gas blew back toward the
Knesset, billowing through windows shattered by rocks. In the chaos,
Begin and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion exchanged insults. Two hundred
civilians and 140 police officers were wounded. Nearly 400 people were
arrested. Knesset business was halted.
Begin then addressed the chamber with a fiery speech condemning the
actions the legislature was about to take. “Today you arrested
hundreds,” he said. “Tomorrow you may arrest thousands. No matter, they
will go, they will sit in prison. We will sit there with them. If
necessary, we will be killed with them. But there will be no
‘reparations’ from Germany.”
Survivors
of the Holocaust feared laundering the reputation of Germany with
money, and mortgaging the memory of their dead. Beyond that, there was a
taste for revenge. “My soul would be at rest if I knew there would be 6
million German dead to match the 6 million Jews,” said Meir Dworzecki,
who’d survived the concentration camps of Estonia.
Ben-Gurion countered this sentiment, not by repudiating vengeance but
with cold calculation: “If I could take German property without sitting
down with them for even a minute but go in with jeeps and machine guns
to the warehouses and take it, I would do that—if, for instance, we had
the ability to send a hundred divisions and tell them, ‘Take it.’ But we
can’t do that.”
The reparations conversation set off a wave of bomb attempts by
Israeli militants. One was aimed at the foreign ministry in Tel Aviv.
Another was aimed at Chancellor Adenauer himself. And one was aimed at
the port of Haifa, where the goods bought with reparations money were
arriving. West Germany ultimately agreed to pay Israel 3.45 billion
deutsche marks, or more than $7 billion in today’s dollars. Individual
reparations claims followed—for psychological trauma, for offense to
Jewish honor, for halting law careers, for life insurance, for time
spent in concentration camps. Seventeen percent of funds went toward
purchasing ships. “By the end of 1961, these reparations vessels
constituted two-thirds of the Israeli merchant fleet,” writes the
Israeli historian Tom Segev in his book The Seventh Million.
“From 1953 to 1963, the reparations money funded about a third of the
total investment in Israel’s electrical system, which tripled its
capacity, and nearly half the total investment in the railways.”
Israel’s GNP tripled during the 12 years of the agreement. The Bank
of Israel attributed 15 percent of this growth, along with 45,000 jobs,
to investments made with reparations money. But Segev argues that the
impact went far beyond that. Reparations “had indisputable psychological
and political importance,” he writes.
Reparations could not make up for the murder perpetrated by the
Nazis. But they did launch Germany’s reckoning with itself, and perhaps
provided a road map for how a great civilization might make itself
worthy of the name.
Assessing the reparations agreement, David Ben-Gurion said:
For the first time in the history of relations between
people, a precedent has been created by which a great State, as a result
of moral pressure alone, takes it upon itself to pay compensation to
the victims of the government that preceded it. For the first time in
the history of a people that has been persecuted, oppressed, plundered
and despoiled for hundreds of years in the countries of Europe, a
persecutor and despoiler has been obliged to return part of his spoils
and has even undertaken to make collective reparation as partial
compensation for material losses.
Something more than moral pressure calls America to reparations. We
cannot escape our history. All of our solutions to the great problems of
health care, education, housing, and economic inequality are troubled
by what must go unspoken. “The reason black people are so far behind now
is not because of now,” Clyde Ross told me. “It’s because of then.” In
the early 2000s, Charles Ogletree went to Tulsa, Oklahoma, to meet with
the survivors of the 1921 race riot that had devastated “Black Wall
Street.” The past was not the past to them. “It was amazing seeing these
black women and men who were crippled, blind, in wheelchairs,” Ogletree
told me. “I had no idea who they were and why they wanted to see me.
They said, ‘We want you to represent us in this lawsuit.’ ” A
commission authorized by the Oklahoma legislature produced a report
affirming that the riot, the knowledge of which had been suppressed for
years, had happened. But the lawsuit ultimately failed, in 2004. Similar
suits pushed against corporations such as Aetna (which insured slaves)
and Lehman Brothers (whose co-founding partner owned them) also have
thus far failed. These results are dispiriting, but the crime with which
reparations activists charge the country implicates more than just a
few towns or corporations. The crime indicts the American people
themselves, at every level, and in nearly every configuration. A crime
that implicates the entire American people deserves its hearing in the
legislative body that represents them.
John Conyers’s HR 40 is the vehicle for that hearing. No one can know
what would come out of such a debate. Perhaps no number can fully
capture the multi-century plunder of black people in America. Perhaps
the number is so large that it can’t be imagined, let alone calculated
and dispensed. But I believe that wrestling publicly with these
questions matters as much as—if not more than—the specific answers that
might be produced. An America that asks what it owes its most vulnerable
citizens is improved and humane. An America that looks away is ignoring
not just the sins of the past but the sins of the present and the
certain sins of the future. More important than any single check cut to
any African American, the payment of reparations would represent
America’s maturation out of the childhood myth of its innocence into a
wisdom worthy of its founders.
In 2010, Jacob S. Rugh,
then a doctoral candidate at Princeton, and the sociologist Douglas S.
Massey published a study of the recent foreclosure crisis. Among its
drivers, they found an old foe: segregation. Black home buyers—even
after controlling for factors like creditworthiness—were still more
likely than white home buyers to be steered toward subprime loans.
Decades of racist housing policies by the American government, along
with decades of racist housing practices by American businesses, had
conspired to concentrate African Americans in the same neighborhoods. As
in North Lawndale half a century earlier, these neighborhoods were
filled with people who had been cut off from mainstream financial
institutions. When subprime lenders went looking for prey, they found
black people waiting like ducks in a pen.
“High
levels of segregation create a natural market for subprime lending,”
Rugh and Massey write, “and cause riskier mortgages, and thus
foreclosures, to accumulate disproportionately in racially segregated
cities’ minority neighborhoods.”
Plunder in the past made plunder in the present efficient. The banks
of America understood this. In 2005, Wells Fargo promoted a series of
Wealth Building Strategies seminars. Dubbing itself “the nation’s
leading originator of home loans to ethnic minority customers,” the bank
enrolled black public figures in an ostensible effort to educate blacks
on building “generational wealth.” But the “wealth building” seminars
were a front for wealth theft. In 2010, the Justice Department filed a
discrimination suit against Wells Fargo alleging that the bank had
shunted blacks into predatory loans regardless of their
creditworthiness. This was not magic or coincidence or misfortune. It
was racism reifying itself. According to TheNew York Times,
affidavits found loan officers referring to their black customers as
“mud people” and to their subprime products as “ghetto loans.”
“We just went right after them,” Beth Jacobson, a former Wells Fargo loan officer, told TheTimes.
“Wells Fargo mortgage had an emerging-markets unit that specifically
targeted black churches because it figured church leaders had a lot of
influence and could convince congregants to take out subprime loans.”
In 2011, Bank of America agreed to pay $355 million to settle charges
of discrimination against its Countrywide unit. The following year,
Wells Fargo settled its discrimination suit for more than $175 million.
But the damage had been done. In 2009, half the properties in Baltimore
whose owners had been granted loans by Wells Fargo between 2005 and 2008
were vacant; 71 percent of these properties were in predominantly black
neighborhoods.
***
Ta-Nehisi Coates is a national correspondent at The Atlantic, where he writes about culture, politics, and social issues. He is the author of the memoir The Beautiful Struggle. ================================================ Sister Callie House Led Early Push for Reparations
Feb. 19, 2014- tennessean.com
Callie House / New York Public Library
Written by Quint Quallsfor The Tennessean
Callie House
• 1861-June 6, 1928
• Helped lead the movement for slave reparations
Callie House, born a slave in 1861, spearheaded the beginnings of
the reparations movements in Nashville 70 years before the civil rights
movement of the 1960s.
At the end of the 19th century, House
joined with the Rev. Isaiah Dickerson to create the National Ex-Slave
Mutual Relief, Bounty and Pension Association. She resided in Nashville
in the area known as the Gulch and had five children with her husband,
Charlie House.
The Jim Crow culture then prevalent in the South
didn’t stop House from demanding that money gained from seized rebel
cotton, which amounted to $68 million (more than $1.7 billion in 2012
dollars), be distributed to former slaves as repayment for centuries of
forced labor.
Many black leaders during the pre-civil rights era
focused on education and quality, not the reparations movement.
Regardless, local association chapters sprung up across the country.
Monthly dues provided burial expenses for members and cared for those
who were sick and disabled. The group also worked on a national level to
lobby Congress for reparations legislation.
Early in the 20th
century, Justice Department officials indicted House and other members
of the organization on charges of mail fraud after the reparations
movement began to lose momentum.
She was convicted by an all-male,
all-white jury and sentenced to a year in prison. After her release,
she went back to work as a washerwoman.
After her death in 1928, she was buried in an unmarked grave in Mount Ararat Cemetery in Nashville.
======================================================
Kara Walker interview:
“The whole reason for refining sugar is to make it white”
The artist’s first public work evokes the not-so-sweet history of sugar and slavery--
The Work:
Homage
to the unpaid and overworked Artisans who have refined our Sweet tastes
from the cane fields to the Kitchens of the New World on the Occasion
of the demolition of the Domino Sugar Refining Plant.
By Paul Laster
Tue May 6 2014- timeout.com
Kara Walker in front of her installation in progress at the Domino Sugar Factory in Brooklyn
Photograph: Alex Strada
Since her graduate-school days at the Rhode Island School of
Design, Kara Walker has courted controversy with her provocative
exploration of slavery in America and its connection to present-day
issues involving race and gender. Her most notable efforts have been
cut-paper murals,
done in the style of old portrait silhouettes, depicting antebellum
plantation life as a hellscape of violence and sexual abjection. Now
Walker is about to unveil her first public artwork, commissioned for the former Domino Sugar Factory in Williamsburg,
Brooklyn. The centerpiece of the project, which references the history
of slavery in the 19th-century sugar trade, is a mammoth female sphinx
created out of sugar. Time Out New York visited the artist on-site to get her take on the very bitter story behind the sweet stuff.
How did the antebellum South become such a major theme in your work?
I
grew up partially around Stone Mountain, Georgia, and in that part of
the country, there was always this aura of mythology and palpable sense
of otherness about being a Southerner. I mean, Gone with the Wind
was playing 24/7 at Ted Turner’s Omni Center in Atlanta. So it’s only
natural that I found myself wanting to address the subject once I moved
north for school.
How did the Domino Sugar Factory project happen?
[Presenting
organization] Creative Time called to say that they had this great site
for me, and Nato Thompson, the curator, mentioned in particular the
molasses-covered surfaces left in the factory. The image of the tar baby
popped into my head, and also this idea of a stickiness or residue that
doesn’t go away. I wanted to draw a bridge between themes—not just
between slavery and the sugar trade, but between industry and
waste—spawned by the fact that molasses is a by-product of processing
sugar. And for me, that represents a metaphor for identity formation.
You mean because the factory was originally built to refine brown sugar into white?
Absolutely.
The whole reason for refining sugar is to make it white. Even the idea
of becoming “refined” seems to dovetail with the Western way of dealing
with the world. How did you settle on using the symbol of a sphinx?
In
Greek mythology the sphinx is a guardian of the city, a devourer of
heroes and the possessor of a riddle that maybe can’t be answered. The
factory is a modern-day ruin, and I think the sphinx contains the
various readings of history that the place represents. But she also
creates this aesthetic contrast of a white sugar object inside a dark,
molasses-encrusted space.
You’ve depicted her in a highly eroticized manner, with huge breasts and an exposed vagina.
Well,
yes, she’s a woman, a bootylicious figure with something paradoxical
about her pose. She’s both a supplicant and an emblem of power. From the
front, she seems to hold her ground. But what you see from behind is
what happens when a nude woman bends over, raising a question of whether
it’s a gesture of sexual passivity or not.
You’ve also given her a very stern expression.
One
of the things I discovered while researching the history of sugar is
that the packaging for molasses tended to relate back to slave lore.
There was Brer Rabbit Molasses, for instance, and also an Aunt Dinah
Molasses picturing a woman in a kerchief. But she wasn’t a smiling,
cookie-jar mammy. She had a severe look with a furrowed brow and smirk
on her face, so I guess I was thinking of that.
The title for the piece includes the phrase A Subtlety. What does that refer to?
It’s
the name for sugar sculptures that were originally made for the tables
of Middle Eastern sultans before being adopted by European nobility. A
subtlety was a display of power and wealth to impress dinner guests.
So your sphinx is a giant subtlety.
Yes,
but by being sexually overt, she’s not very subtle at all. She’s
discomfiting. And as far as the riddle she poses, it’s maybe answered in
her figure, though as I mentioned before, that only begets other
questions.
The sphinx is actually part of an ensemble
that includes a group of boys cast in molasses. What do they represent,
and what’s their overall function within the installation as a whole?
They’re
her attendants, her children. They’re laborers and supplicants, and yet
also endearing portraits. They were based on contemporary gift items
made in China.
How does this project relate to the rest of your work?
It’s
a departure for sure. Not the end of the other work, just an expansion
of my horizons. It still deals with the themes that interest me: race,
gender, sex and slavery.
The same real-estate developer
who will transform the site into condos is also a sponsor of your
project. Do you worry that your work is being used as part of the
gentrification process?
I don’t see how that could succeed. I
have this fantasy that once the installation comes down, the sphinx’s
presence will somehow remain. That people will remember something
legendary happened here, and that the legend contained histories of
sugar and of slavery, and representations of femaleness and sweetness.
Sugar is so much a part of our world. It’s this kind of goddess who we
give ourselves over to.
The very long subtitle of Walker's first ever public-art project reads an Homage
to the unpaid and overworked Artisans who have refined our Sweet tastes
from the cane fields to the Kitchens of the New World on the Occasion
of the demolition of the Domino Sugar Refining Plant.
While the
word artisan is a bit vague, the subject of sugar is certainly in
keeping with the artist's career-long investigation of the historical
wages of slavery and racism. Sugar was a key leg of the so-called
triangle trade that traversed the Atlantic between the 16th and 19th
centuries, as European slavers brought their human cargo to the
Caribbean in exchange for molasses, which was then transported back to
the Continent to be made into rum. Meanwhile, the subtlety of the title
refers to sugar sculptures that once adorned the tables of the rich and
powerful in Medieval Europe—which, given the rarity and expense of the
substance at the time, were meant as displays of wealth. Accordingly,
Walker's project for the old Domino Sugar factory in Williamsburg,
Brooklyn centers on a giant female sphinx made of the sweet stuff.
Although the installation relates to the site's past, it retains a
sphinxlike silence about the location's future as a complex of office
and residential towers along the Williamsburg waterfront.