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From
the streets of Ferguson to the South Carolina statehouse, the legacy of
slavery in the United States has taken on a new urgency in contemporary
America. Today, 150 years after the end of the Civil War, so many of
slavery’s scars are still visible, particularly in the South. We must
also remember America’s all-but-forgotten ties to slavery in a deeper
south – Cuba.
Last December,
President Obama announced a new era in U.S.-Cuba relations: “America
chooses to cut loose the shackles of the past so as to reach for a
better future,” he said, “for the Cuban people, for the American people,
for our entire hemisphere, and for the world.” These words also hint at
a darker history before the Cuban Revolution; before the construction
of Cuban casinos, hotels and nightclubs; before even the
Spanish-American War. More than 200 years ago, the horrors of Cuban
slavery and the slave trade made America possible.
Of the 12.5
million enslaved Africans who were brought to the Americas from 1501 to
1867, approximately 4 percent arrived in North America. Another 7
percent were taken to Cuba to work in what is now recognized as an
“agro-industrial graveyard” of sugar and coffee production. Historians
use this term for good reason: the life expectancy of enslaved Africans
from the time of their arrival in Cuba was often calculated in single
digits. These catastrophic mortality rates meant that Cuban slavery
depended on the slave trade. Although the U.S. and England banned the
slave trade in 1808, fully 85 percent (759,669) of the slaves to be
transported to Cuba were brought after the U.S. ban. By this
time, Americans had decided that Cuban slavery made good economic sense
and were actively intensifying their participation in the regime.
After
the American Revolution, the young United States was deeply in debt and
on the verge of a rapid expansion of the cotton frontier. But the U.S.
merchants who ran the nation’s banks and insurance companies could only
provide agricultural loans with a reliable source of specie (gold and
silver), and sugar and coffee to back their notes and offset trade
deficits with the financial centers of Europe. If coffee, sugar and
specie unlocked the doors of European and Asian markets for U.S.
investors, slave ships were their key. By the early 1800s, Cuban slavery
was at the center of this exchange, and American statesmen, including
every U.S. president from Thomas Jefferson to John Quincy Adams, worked
doggedly to protect it.
This is why, despite the spread of
antislavery sentiment and abolitionism on both sides of the Atlantic,
despite numerous laws and treaties passed to curb the slave trade, and
despite the dispatch of naval squadrons to patrol the coasts of Africa
and the Americas, the slave trade did not end in 1808. In fact, in many
later years it intensified, and economic policies of free trade often
worked in tandem with the expansion of slavery. The dismantling of trade
restrictions – often framed as striking a blow for emancipation –
actually strengthened slavery in Cuba and throughout the hemisphere. At
every level, Americans made this possible.
In Washington, D.C., U.S. foreign policy
protected the expansion of Cuban slavery, most famously with President
James Monroe’s declaration in 1823 that, “The American continents … are
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by
any European powers.” Known as the Monroe Doctrine, this statement
purported to ban Europeans from the hemisphere and would later be
heralded as a cornerstone in U.S. diplomacy for generations. At the time
of its formulation, however, it was intended to prevent British
meddling in the illegal slave trade by Americans with personal interests
in the massive expansion of Cuban slavery.
By the 1820s, Cuba had
become the second-largest trade partner of the United States and
largest sugar producer in the world. American investors, policymakers
and merchants – including many from the U.S. North – were involved in
every aspect of this development. Some Americans even became expatriate
owners and operators of Cuban plantations themselves. In Cuba, a Rhode
Islander traded a factory account book for a plantation invoice that
listed 103 enslaved men, women and children; a New Yorker forced
enslaved Africans to build stone walls around their homes to prevent
escape; and a Connecticut merchant, convinced that leniency would
trigger revolt, turned his manor into a fortress surrounded by armed
guards and dogs. These Northerners had no illusions about Cuban slavery.
Today, this past has been
forgotten. Across the United States, museums, monuments and historical
sites devoted to slavery have become flashpoints in a national dialogue
on issues of race and inequality. Cuba should be a part of this
conversation, not only because Cuban slavery and the illegal slave trade
helped to create the United States, but also because it is important to
remember that this was a choice. In the Early Republic, American
leaders made Cuban slavery and the outlawed slave trade a foundation for
national development and expansion.
This set the stage for a boom in
cotton production and decades of interdependent, ultimately fractious
economic growth that would trigger the U.S. Civil War. Now, as the
U.S.-Cuba rapprochement continues, shining a light on this shared legacy
can help both nations begin again.
The decisive role of the illegal slave trade in the making of the United States
From 1501 to 1867 more than 12.5 million Africans were brought to the Americas in chains, and many millions died
as a result of the slave trade. The US constitution set a 20-year time
limit on US participation in the trade, and on January 1, 1808, it was
abolished. And yet, despite the spread of abolitionism on both sides of
the Atlantic, despite numerous laws and treaties passed to curb the
slave trade, and despite the dispatch of naval squadrons to patrol the
coasts of Africa and the Americas, the slave trade did not end in 1808.
Fully 25 percent of all the enslaved Africans to arrive in the Americas
were brought after the US ban – 3.2 million people.
This
breakthrough history, based on years of research into private
correspondence; shipping manifests; bills of laden; port, diplomatic,
and court records; and periodical literature, makes undeniably clear how
decisive illegal slavery was to the making of the United States. US
economic development and westward expansion, as well as the growth and
wealth of the North, not just the South, was a direct result and driver
of illegal slavery. The Monroe Doctrine was created to protect the
illegal slave trade.
In an engrossing, elegant, enjoyably
readable narrative, Stephen M. Chambers not only shows how illegal
slavery has been wholly overlooked in histories of the early Republic,
he reveals the crucial role the slave trade played in the lives and
fortunes of figures like John Quincy Adams and the “generation of
1815,” the post-revolution cohort that shaped US foreign policy. This is
a landmark history that will forever revise the way the early Republic
and American economic development is seen.
“Stephen Chambers brings a bright
searchlight to a dark corner of history: the illegal slave trade that
was so central to the rise of American capitalism. The book is
especially valuable in a historical moment when the legacy of race and
slavery haunts American politics.”
– Marcus Rediker, author of The Amistad Rebellion: An Atlantic Odyssey of Slavery and Freedom
“With deep research and narrative style,
Stephen Chambers challenges a significant misunderstanding about the
so-called Era of Good Feelings. As he shows, the apparent ‘end’ of the
slave trade in 1808 did little to stem the growth of slavery in the
United States. Through huge investment in Cuba, American interests,
including northern interests, deepened their dependence upon slavery and
the slave trade, at exactly the moment it was supposed to be in
decline. No God But Gain is an important corrective to the historical
record.”
– Ted Widmer, author of Brown: The History of an Idea
“Stephen Chambers’ engagingly written
new book will grab readers with its narratives from the lives of New
Englanders who traveled to Cuba to participate more directly in the
exploitation of the half million enslaved Africans brought to the island
after the U.S. supposedly banned participation in the Atlantic slave
trade and played a crucial role in an era of explosive American economic
growth.”
– Edward E. Baptist, author of The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism
“Attentive to intrigue, irony, and
violence, this is a bold account that moves from Boston counting houses
to Havana consular offices to the halls of Congress, tracing the global
circulation of capital, commodities, and slaves that fueled the
development of American empire in the early Republic. No God But Gain is
full of provocative arguments—not least that liberal trade policy went
hand-in-hand with human bondage, and that the Monroe Doctrine was
designed to protect the illegal slave trade.”
– Amy Stanley, author of From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation
“Stephen Chambers’ vivid reconstruction
of the active involvement of northern investors, merchants, financiers,
speculators, and politicians in the expansion of the Cuban slave economy
and the international slave trade recasts the history of the early
American Republic. It opens new perspectives for interpreting United
States history within broader currents of Atlantic history.”
– Dale Tomich, author of Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital, and World Economy
“Chambers' book is a compelling look at American history prior to the Civil War.”
Sean Wilentz’s latest op-ed in the New York Times, “Constitutionally, Slavery Is No National Institution,”
argues that it is a “myth that the United States was founded on racial
slavery.” Instead, the Princeton professor demonstrates a woeful
misreading of the debates over the drafting of the Constitution. That
the document does not contain the words “slave” or “slavery” in no way
indicates that it was written to reject the institution. In the debates,
the delegates almost always employed euphemisms such as “this unique
species of property,” “this unhappy class,” or “such other persons,” as
stand-ins for the more repugnant “slaves.” They simply carried that
practice over to the final document.
But whether or not the
words appear in the text of the Constitution, they dominate its spirit.
Slavery was instrumental to the economic well being of not only the
states in which it was pervasive, but also in the North. As such,
slavery profoundly altered the four months of Constitutional debate,
both with respect to obvious issues, such as how slaves would be counted
for apportionment, and some more indirect, such as how often would the
census be taken, or how a president would be elected. By the time the
Constitution was signed on September 17, 1787, slavery had indeed become
a national institution.
Key to fully appreciating the impact of
slave economics at the Constitutional Convention is that slavery had
cleaved the nation into not two, but three separate and conflicting
socio-economic systems. In the lower South, primarily South Carolina,
the staple crop was rice: immensely profitable, but grown in fetid,
leech- and snake-infested swamps in which slaves toiled all summer in
thigh-deep standing water. Mortality was high; many slaves survived only
two or three years. South Carolina therefore needed a constant influx
of able-bodied males to overcome the attrition, and the cheapest place
to get them was Africa. The rice planters were thus committed both to
slavery as an institution as well as perpetuation of the slave trade,
not at all the same thing.
The upper South grew tobacco,
cultivated in open country under what, by comparison, were temperate
conditions. Slaves bred rather than died, resulting in a crippling
oversupply. As the convention began, slaves in Virginia likely
outnumbered whites. But tobacco planters couldn’t fire their
workers—they had to feed, clothe, and house them from birth to death. In
addition to the financial burden, white southerners lived in constant
dread of slaves—whom they regarded as sub-human savages—rising up and
slaughtering them. During the war, though the army was undermanned,
troops in the southern states were often held out of action to guard
against slave revolts.
The upper South wanted desperately to rid
themselves of the surplus. The obvious solution was to sell to the rice
growers. But to make the domestic slave trade worthwhile, tobacco
planters needed to recoup the investment they had already made in those
slaves, which pushed the price to levels that Atlantic slave traders
could easily undercut. With the cheaper African option available to rice
planters, Virginians found themselves in the curious position of being
defenders of slavery but opponents of the slave trade.
Finally,
the North’s economy was dominated by finance, manufacturing, and
shipping. They brought rice and tobacco to Europe and returned with the
fineries that planters required to maintain their aristocratic lifestyle
(to say nothing of side trips to the west coast of Africa for a return
cargo of a different sort). So long as northerners could ensure the free
flow of commerce, their wealth would increase.
It became clear early on that these three competing groups would engage in a shifting game of odd-man-out.
When
it came to fashioning a legislature, the South spoke with one voice. In
1787, the North was more populous, but expansion was expected to trend
south and west, with as many as ten new (slave) states joining the
Union. The Northwest Ordinance limited new free state admissions to
five. If slave owners could hold out for 20 years or so, they might well
be able to control the government. That process would be foreshortened
if southerners could “supplement” the electorate by including slaves in
apportionment, a measure that northerners were certain to oppose. On the
other hand, southerners—especially Virginians—were none too keen on
paying direct taxes on their slaves, which northerners insisted on
linking to apportionment.
North and South debated one tortured
construction after another until, after three days, they settled on
counting slaves as three-fifths of whites. Southerners, who previously
had insisted that slaves were property had to admit that, for
apportionment, they were people. Northerners, who had denounced the
enslavement of human beings, found themselves insisting they were
property.
The three-fifths compromise would be moot,
however, unless southern states found a means to incorporate population
shifts into legislative apportionment. So they pushed for a periodic
census whose results would form the basis for representation.
Northerners wanted to perpetuate the status quo as long as possible and
were thus in the unenviable position of trying to persuade the
convention not to count the number of people in the country. They tried but failed, and a ten-year period was finally agreed to.
In
late July, after two months of wrangling, the convention appointed a
five-delegate Committee of Detail to draft, in secret, a prototype
constitution. Anyone who has been in business or government knows that
creating the working document bestows enormous influence and power. To
chair this all-important committee, the delegates unanimously agreed on
South Carolina’s John Rutledge, “Dictator John,” the convention’s
fiercest, most unapologetic defender of slavery. (James Madison, whose
influence had been waning as the months wore on, was specifically
excluded.) Rutledge’s selection made certain that whatever terms emerged
would protect slaveholders’ interests.
And so they did. When
debate resumed, based on the committee’s report, slaveholders won a
series of concessions—on the makeup of the Senate, fugitive slaves,
admission of new states, the election of the president, and even the
Electoral College. In late August, however, the question of the national
government’s control of commerce came up. Here, the North would not
budge. In a compromise fashioned principally by Rutledge and fellow
Committee of Detail member Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, the slave
trade was extended for 20 years (after which the South would be
protected by population shifts) and the free flow of commerce was
assured when a proposal by the South to require a two-thirds majority to
pass navigation acts was stricken.
Virginia delegates were livid, none
more so than the influential George Mason, who denounced the “infernal
traffic” in a speech for which he has been incorrectly lauded by some
historians, since he was convention’s largest slaveholder. (Rutledge was
number two.)
So upset was Mason that he refused to sign the
Constitution, and Virginia, a state that had taken the lead in calling
for a new constitution, only barely agreed to adopt the document during
the ratifying conventions.
So, perhaps as Professor
Wilentz suggests, the Constitution didn’t specifically anoint slavery as
a national institution, but in clause after clause it tried to make
certain that slavery would endure as one. --------------------------------
Lawrence Goldstone is the author of Dark Bargain: Slavery, Profits, and the Struggle for the Constitution and Inherently Unequal: The Betrayal of Equal Rights by the Supreme Court, 1865-1903.